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There are limited, but increasing, attempts at quantitatively measuring the distance between de 
jure provisions and their de facto adherence. Such attempts seem mostly concerned with rights 
provisions, but some also concern the independence of the judiciary. This thesis seeks to enter 
the discussion on how such measurement should happen by contributing an index of 
constitutional compliance for a set of 175 states through 41 years. The index attempts to 
measure both structural and rights provisions. It is divided into four components, one for 
provisions regarding the executive, one for the legislature, one for the judiciary and public 
administration, and one for rights.  
 
The index is further analysed to assess amongst predictors from the literature on state 
repression of de facto rights, what might prove to be influencing a broader concept of 
constitutional compliance. The findings indicate that executive compliance with the high 
court’s decisions and electoral democracy lead to increases in compliance scores across 
countries. The comprehensiveness of the constitution, or how many provisions are present, 
have a curvilinear relationship with compliance but also seems a consistent predictor. The main 
determinant of compliance seems to be, however, path dependency. 
 
Constitutions perform many functions, where constitutionalism is of particular interest for this 
thesis. Constitutional compliance is here conceptualised as the mechanism through which 
restraining and enabling of government power happens. The index is a first step towards further 
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“Why would the government behave like the proverbial chicken that stays inside the chalk 
circle it could easily transgress?” (Elster 2015, 442).  
 
There seems to be some sort of perpetual paradox connected to the authority of constitutions. 
“Rather than being presented as an exchange of promises between separate parties, modern 
constitutions are typically styled as frameworks which “we the people” give ourselves (Holmes 
1988, 209). What power constitutions could possibly hold have been a philosophical as well as 
empirically grounded concern. If a sovereign is, well, sovereign, how can he bind himself? He 
is powerless if he could be bound by the past, but similarly powerless if he cannot bind himself 
for the future (Hardin 1999, 162). The argument, however, changes when the agent making the 
promise to itself is not a single agent. A state consists of many actors with interests in the 
continued functioning of the institutions that make up government, which is how compliance 
is generally explained (Tushnet 2014, 37).  
 
While there are many theoretical explanations for constitutional compliance, there are few 
attempts at measuring the phenomenon systematically across countries. “Still, a document’s 
bearing the label “a constitution” and declaring its own control over all other political acts 
proves nothing. We need to distinguish between the authority a text asserts and the authority it 
exerts” (Murphy 1993, 7-8). This is precisely the aim of this thesis; to distinguish between de 
jure provisions and de facto adherence to them.  
 
“Yet the category of sham constitutions is inevitably imperfect. Practice in almost every 
nation will fail to correspond with some aspects of that nation’s formal constitution, at least 
from some perspective, and so we need a metric for determining when the shortfall is great 
enough to make the constitution a sham. That metric is again almost inevitably going to be 
a matter of controversy: How much weight should it give to shortfalls with respect to rights 




This endeavour is not altogether straightforward, however, as measuring adherence to a 
constitution is both empirically and theoretically challenging. Constitutions can be rather long 
and complex documents with some rather specific provisions. They frequently include 
“excruciating detail” on flags, anthems and other national symbols, or specifies currencies 
without taking inflation into account (Elkins, Ginsburg, Melton 2009, 52).  Not all provisions 
can then be of interest for a compliance measure. The second question that arises is then 
compliance for what reason? In this thesis compliance is understood as a mechanism through 
which the constitution can perform different functions. It is more specifically operationalised 
for the performance of constitutionalism.  
 
1.1 Structure of the thesis  
 
The aim of this thesis is to explore the possibility of operationalising and measuring 
constitutionalism. Measuring constitutionalism itself seems too big a task for a project of such 
scope as this, and the focus is rather on measurement that would be necessary for the 
operationalisation of constitutionalism. By this, I mean that measuring constitutional 
compliance is introduced as a starting point for operationalisation of constitutionalism.  
 
My research question is therefore how does one measure constitutional compliance? And what 
can we expect to influence levels of constitutional adherence? 
 
The structure of this thesis is then as follows. Chapter 2 provides an overview of the theoretical 
foundations of the thesis. Literature on constitutional functions in general, and more 
specifically, constitutionalism is introduced, before other quantitative research into 
constitutional compliance is discussed. In Chapter 3, the operationalisation of constitutionalism 
and the methodological framework for constructing the compliance index is presented. Chapter 
4 provides an overview of cursory findings from the index. Chapter 5 presents a more in-depth 
attempt at analysis of the compliance measure using multilevel modelling to assess predictors 
of constitutional compliance. Lastly, Chapter 6 provides the concluding remarks.  
 
1.2 Why study constitutionalism and compliance? 
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In order to assess the roles constitutions play in different contexts, it is important to 
operationalise and measure the different constitutional functions. Measuring constitutional 
compliance is an attempt at moving towards operationalisation of constitutionalism as a 
function of the constitution. The argument put forth by this thesis is that compliance is the 
mechanism through which constitutionalism happens. There are many different 
conceptualisations of constitutionalism, and while I operate with one myself, the central 
argument and therefore motivation of the thesis is that regardless of what attributes are included 
in the theoretical definition of constitutionalism, constitutional compliance is necessary. As 
such, the ability to classify cases of constitutional compliance and non-compliance becomes 
integral to any attempted empirical assessment of constitutionalism. My aim is therefore to 
engage in the question of how this could be done. 
 
1.3 How to study constitutional compliance? 
 
The empirical study of constitutional compliance ought, in my opinion, be subject to both 
qualitative and quantitative inquiries. If qualitative work can foster questions about how things 
might be connected at a broader level and “[l]ikewise, when statistical results about the effects 
of causes are reported, it seems natural to ask if these results make sense in terms of the history 
of individual cases; one wishes to try to locate the effects in specific cases” (Mahoney and 
Goertz 2006, 231). The measure here is created with this hope in mind. 
 
Attempting to describe the gap between de jure and de facto by using snapshots in time 
disallows the effect of time, which will then bias the findings. Constitutions often involve 
describing institutions as they should be and allowing for the possibility of a maturing effect 
in their study is therefore important (Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton 2016, 236). This does not 
mean disregarding any gaps with the excuse of aspirations, but rather allowing that any 
snapshot in time will inevitably capture states at different points in their constitutional lifespan.  
 
There are definitive drawbacks to studying constitutions quantitatively, however. To see if it 
is even possible to draw any inferences about constitutional compliance it is necessary to study 
it across historical, economic, cultural, legal, political, and social circumstances, which all 
ought to be taken into account. Since the methods applied here are quantitative only, these 
contextual differences escape measurement. That is not to say any quantitative venture into the 
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world of constitutions is useless or limited in its contributions. Different tools have different 




The thesis’ main result is in many ways the creation of a compliance index. The index 
encompasses 175 countries and a time period of 41 years, from 1980 to 2020. A central aim of 
this endeavour is to further research into and discussions around how to measure concepts such 
as compliance, and more broadly constitutionalism, though that is too broad of a concept to 
deal with fully here. The compliance index is still a work in progress, as data on more 
provisions ought to be added for a more complete measure. Chapter 4 provides an overview 
into the index, with some numbers on the variables generated and a cursory look into some 
bivariate correlations. Chapter 5 provides a more in-depth analysis, through a multilevel 
regression, and findings seem to be that electoral democracy, executive compliance with the 
decisions of the high court on decisions it does not favour, and a quadratic term for the number 
of provisions present all affect levels of compliance. The first two relationships are positive, 
and the latter of a convex nature.  
  
 5 
2 Constitutions and constitutionalism 
 
“[…] Nowadays “constitution” has become an ambiguous term, covering two very different 
meanings: a strict, substantive meaning (the garantiste meaning), and a formal, cosmic 
meaning. It follows from this that whereas in the 19th century a question such as, “What is 
the role of a constitution in a political system?”, could be answered without asking first, 
“What is a constitution?”, this is no longer the case.” (Sartori 1962, 857).  
 
Sartori (1962, 857) writes of how the answer to this first question becomes banal and 
uninteresting if a constitution is defined narrowly as an organizational “map” of exercisable 
power in the polity, but also how the answer is different for each country one would examine. 
The first part of this position has not been shared by all. Later academics1 have expanded 
greatly on what roles a constitution can play in a political system, even if such a system is not 
a liberal democratic one capable of the garantiste function. Some have even done work on how 
they perform in autocratic regimes.  
 
The second part of Sartori’s position, however, seems commonly accepted given the tendency 
to qualitative methods in the fields of comparative law and constitutions. Such a 
“Montesquieuan” approach to the distinctiveness of national constitutions suggests there can 
be limited means for comparison across differing countries (Tushnet 2014, 2-4). There have, 
however, been efforts to identify “[…] functions common to all constitutional systems […]”, 
following a more “Benthamite” logic of functionalism expressed as a “[…] universal grammar 
of government” (Tushnet 2014, 3). There have also been efforts to consider what roles a 
constitution might play in a theoretical entity and to identify where such might have occurred 
(see for instance Galligan and Versteeg 2013).  
 
The following chapter starts with considerations of several functions constitutions might have 
in different political, social and historical systems, before focusing more specifically on 
constitutionalism. This last function is at the core of what Sartori (1962, 859-860) argued a 
constitution ought to do, or what its purpose should be understood as. Constitutionalism is 
certainly established today as one of, if not the, most important effects of the constitutional 
 
1 See for instance Ginsburg and Simpser 2014 
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order (Elkins, Ginsburg, Melton 2009, 38). Following is a discussion on concepts of 
constitutionalism and more specifically a discussion on compliance as a necessary component 
of such. In the last part of the chapter, focus turns to previous, quantitative research on the 
effects of de jure provisions and their corresponding, de facto situations.  
 
2.1 Defining constitutions 
   
Constitution has sometimes been thought to be a somewhat ambiguous term, though differing 
understandings can typically be separated into two categories defined either in terms of their 
form or their functions. The word can be understood to refer to the wider constitutional order 
or more specifically to a written text often titled "The Constitution" (Elkins, Ginsburg, and 
Melton 2009, 38-39). The constitutional order comprises of the many functions a constitution 
might perform for its constituency, through the text itself or through other texts or nontextual 
instruments (Elkins, Ginsburg and Melton 2009, 40-47). 
 
Understanding the constitution through its functions means understanding the constitution as 
social and political phenomena. They are at once independent documents outlining the rules of 
government while also being interdependent upon their political context, in which they are 
constantly interpreted and oftentimes amended (Galligan and Versteeg 2013, 7). This interplay 
means that a constitution might serve several differing functions simultaneously, while also 
performing different functions at different times given evolving social and political 
circumstances. This section seeks to explore some of these functions. 
 
2.1.1 Expressions of value 
  
One function of the constitution is its symbolic power; constitutions can be expressions of 
value (Elkins, Melton and Ginsburg 2009, 38; Galligan and Versteeg 2013, 8-14). 
These values can be national ones, reflecting a sense of shared history and identity, and they 
can be transnational; disseminated through outside coercion, competition between states, 
learning or a desire for international legitimacy and acceptance (Galligan and Versteeg 2013, 
15-18). Whether these values actually influence the behaviour of government officials and 
institutions boils down to questions of the effects of constitutions in practice; claims that would 
depend on the differing contexts of individual constitutions (Galligan and Versteeg 2013, 11). 
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Expressions of value need not be more than aspirational statements or window dressing. They 
might serve as “mission statements” guiding the polity with some holistic purpose as to the 
nature of its commitments (King 2013, 81). A constitutional text might tell of the goals, ideals, 
and normative standards its authors wish the polity to be judged by, both by others and by their 
own future (Murphy 1993, 10). At the very least, constitutions can generate symbolic value 
which can be utilised to cause a sense of legitimacy and popular support for the state (Ginsburg 
and Huq 2016, 16).   
 
2.1.2 Enshrining rights 
  
Furthermore, it is often considered a central function of constitutions to lay out the rights (and 
duties) of the citizens (see for instance Elster 2015, 439). These can be vertical, prohibiting 
governmental interference in the lives of citizens, or horizontal, though the first type is much 
more widespread (Elster 2015, 440). In subsequent waves of constitutions-making rights 
provisions have changed in terms of substance. In addition to the so-called “first-generation 
rights”, which enshrined the rights to freedom of speech, freedom of assembly among others, 
“second-generation rights” enshrined social, cultural, and economic rights. “Third-generation 
rights” are considered as vaguer and centres around positive rights such as the right to 
development (Elster 2015, 440). 
 
2.1.3 Establishing rules of the game and the institutional landscape of the state 
  
Another constitutional function is the determining and regulating of government machinery 
through the structuring of institutions and of their relations to one another (Elster 2015, 439). 
This can also be seen as a component in the understanding of constitutions as coordination 
devices. The establishment of institutional power structures, then governing in accordance with 
the constitution, and the acquiescence of society to the resulting coordination, enables effective 
governing (Galligan and Versteeg 2013, 23). Constitutions also establish rules for amendment 
and map out the potential for suspension of the constitution in times of crisis (Elster 2015, 439).  
 
Constitutions can act as stabilisers, by existing as credible commitment instruments, which 
allows for predictability within systems and therefore economic growth. Constitutions thus 
provide solutions to problems of information and coordination (Hirschl 2013, 161). This 
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constitutional function is thought to operate in both democratic and autocratic regimes. 
Albertus and Menaldo (2013) indeed find that constitutions formed under dictatorships can 
foster economic growth and increased survival of the autocratic coalition.  
 
Hardin (1999) offers an understanding of constitutions as coordination devices by creating a 
set of governing institutions, which again constrain certain behaviour. This role of enabling 
allows for organisation within society, whereas the second role is to simultaneously block 
certain forms of coordination. Instant coordination ought to be blocked, as the alternative in 
many cases would be mob rule (Hardin 1999, 82). Hardin seems here to equate the 
constitutional system, or the constitution, with constitutionalism; coordination might then 
arguably be seen as an effect of constitutionalism, which is by Hardin understood as enabling 
and restraining government power in democratic systems.  His argument was also a rejection 
of constitutions as contracts. “A constitution is not a contract; indeed it creates the institution 
of contracting, which would be de facto impossible without a constitutional or other strong 
order to back it” (Hardin 1999, 87). 
 
2.1.4 Social contracts 
 
The use of contracts as metaphors for understanding constitutions and explaining their 
legitimacy in their role of binding autonomous individuals have a long history. It has not been 
without its fair share of critique, as previewed in the previous section. Contracts typically 
require agreement from all involved parties, a neutral third-party enforcer and are expected to 
be fulfilled rather than permanently endure (Ginsburg 2013, 182-184), though it might be worth 
to note that as the median constitutional lifespan is 19 years (Elkins, Ginsburg and Melton 2009, 
129) they cannot be considered as permanent institutions.  Ginsburg (2013, 183) offers contract 
theory as a supplementary tool to coordination theories. The argument is that contract theory 
helps explain how those actually involved with the drafting of the document bargain, and 
therefore gives a practical insight into the processes of how constitutions are formed as opposed 
to the theoretical or normative foundation of constitutions.    
 
One such practical aspect is the contents of constitutions. If constitutions operate like contracts, 
one can expect the drafters to be experts of some kind, representing stakeholders, and drawing 
on templates of already existing charters and agreements to write their own document 
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(Ginsburg 2013, 196). And while there may be no ultimate third-party enforcement, there are 
international forces and agreements exerting pressure on states to include or uphold certain 
provisions in their constitutions (Ginsburg 2013, 186-187; Alter 2014).  
 
Constitutions thus perform according to contract theory if we understand them as negotiated 
by a few powerful agents, then acquiesced to by the people at large for reasons either explained 
by coordination theories or contract theories (Ginsburg 2013, 185). This perspective on 
constitutions thus links their functions as coordination devices with their functions as elite 
bargains. 
 
2.1.5 Constitutions understood as elite bargains 
 
Built on an understanding of elites as rational actors seeking to protect and maximize their self-
interest, it is posited that political elites will play an instrumental role in the processes of 
constitution-making and reform (Galligan and Versteeg 2013, 19). “This strategic-realist 
approach is premised on the notion of constitutional law as a form of politics by other means” 
(Hirschl 2013, 157). This understanding then offers an alternative to those that considers 
constitutions and constitutional reform to be an ideational victory or a response to the need for 
coordination. 
 
If one applies such an understanding of constitutional drafting and change, it might at first 
glance seem counter-intuitive that some less-than-democratic states ends up with some 
limitations on power baked into their charter. This is assumed explained, however, by how 
secure elites feel in their position and whether they feel the need to secure themselves for a 
time after leaving office or other positions of power (Hirschl 2013, 167). If those elites feel 
rather safe in their continued holding of power, they might seek fewer restraints in the 
documents.  
 
Brown (2002, 101) gives us another example of how constitutions can perform as bargains 
between elites; he considers the handling of slavery in the U.S. Constitution to showcase how 




“Constitution making also illustrates the variety of motivations that can animate social agents, 
and notably the interplay among interest, passion, and reason” (Elster 2015, 437). When 
constitutions perform the function of elite bargaining, they might be considered as more 
compromise, indecision, and chance, rather than careful deliberation (Galligan and Versteeg 
2013, 20). Elster (2015, 447-450) argues that while constitutions and constitutional design 
matter, they might not matter in the same ways or to the same degree as its designers might 
have thought.  
 
Certain intended effects can fail to materialise, and unintended consequences can arise. This 
might lead to the need for renegotiation, or amendment, to borrow from contract theory 
(Ginsburg 2013, 194). Or such unintended consequences might lead to more constrains on 
powerholders than the drafters intended for. Brown (2002, 103) gives the example of how 
European constitutions of the nineteenth century, written to serve short-term elite bargains, had 
served principles of constitutionalism.  
 
2.1.6 Limitations on government 
 
Often considered by some as the most important function of a constitution, is the limitations 
put upon government by the general outline of principles and provisions any future government 
is to abide by. Constitutions thus simultaneously give form to governments while limiting its 
exercise of powers (Sartori 1962, 856).  
 
One of the central premises this paper rests on is that the existence of a "correct" way of 
exercising power laid out by the constitution will raise the costs of acting "incorrectly", even 
if there is a dearth of obstacles in the form of liberal democratic institutions. This cost might 
be nowhere near high enough to prevent arbitrary exercises of power, or it might in fact be 
negated by a document allowing these very things. But as there seems to be a convergence in 
constitutional form across democratic and authoritarian regimes, even if this does not translate 
into a convergence of functions (Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton 2014, 162), there are fewer 
documents without some forms of constraints or limitations on power.  
 
Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton (2009, 39) argues that while establishing the rules of the game 
inevitably provides some form of restraint on executive behaviours, they are fundamentally, 
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albeit subtly, different from constraints stemming from principles of constitutionalism. This 
distinction is what Sartori (1962) argues for with his adaption of Loewenstein’s framework 
into the categories of garantiste, nominal and façade constitutions. His argument is that the 
function of constitutionalism was inherent to the original understanding of what a constitution 
was supposed to do. The document would, along with a corresponding set of institutions, “[…] 
restrict arbitrary power and ensure ‘limited government’” (Sartori 1962, 855). This garantiste 
understanding differs substantially from the nominal constitution, which was fully complied 
with, but nonetheless was without any actual restraints on power. A nominal constitution is a 
power map, indicating where power already exists. The third category of sham, however, 
contains the provisions of a garantiste constitution but fails to comply with them (Sartori 1962, 
861).  
 
This contrasts with other approaches to constitutionalism, such as that of Brown (2002). His 
view of constitutionalism as a function can emerge from constitutions not at all designed for 
this feature has been pointed out earlier. Constitutionalism, and it’s differing definitions, are 
the topics for this next section. Particular attention is paid to the discussions centred around the 
inclusion or exclusion of democracy as a prerequisite of the constitutionalism concept.  
 
2.2 Different understandings of constitutionalism 
 
Constitutionalism is thus one of those concepts where each author seemingly has their own, 
slightly different, understanding as to the meaning of the word. Some of this assumed 
discrepancy might simply stem from how expansive a definition is applied and what limitations 
on government is thought to actually entail. For instance, there are scholars who consider 
liberal democracy as an integral prerequisite to the functioning of constitutionalism (for 
instance Hardin 1999), while others exclude it from the concept altogether (for instance Brown 
2002). 
 
"[…] in all its successive phases, constitutionalism has one essential quality; it is a legal 
limitation on government; it is the antithesis of arbitrary rule; its opposite is despotic 
government, the government of will instead of law" (McIlwain 1947, 21-22).  This McIlwain 
(1947, 22) holds to be the most ancient part of constitutionalism, and the constant, if not the 
most important part. Real protections against arbitrary and despotic government, he argues, is 
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those of the ancient legal limitations and what he calls the modern political responsibility 
(McIlwain 1947, 142). Even definitions as seemingly simple as those concerned with 
limitations on government generate debates. Tushnet (2013a, 36-39) argues that a narrow 
reading of the first definition2 would allow for constitutionalism to exist in regimes decidedly 
not committed to thicker definitions of the concept. The addition of modern political 
responsibility to all of the people by those elected, however, changes his assessment of 
McIlwain’s definition to what he calls the creation of a dichotomous conceptualisation of 
constitutionalism. The alternatives must be either despotism or constitutional democracy 
(Tushnet 2013a, 36). 
 
"The element of constraint means that neither anarchy nor a totalizing concentration of 
power (in one, a few, or many hands) is consistent with constitutionalism. Between 
these two poles, however, a range of constitutionalist politics or political systems is 
possible. A constitutionalist system will include three essential elements: (1) 
institutions authorized by and accountable to the people (both in the regular operation 
of government and, perhaps, in the making of the constitutional order); (2) some notion 
of limited government (whether by the designation of purposes for governmental action, 
the specification of rights, or the allocation of authority among institutions); and (3) the 
rule of law (i.e., the regularization of processes by which public norms are made and 
applied)." Brandon 2015, 2 
 
This definition opens for such a pluralization of constitutionalism that Tushnet (2014) argues 
for, as a fully democratic system of governance is not at all necessary to satisfy these demands. 
Brown (2002, 9) gives us the historical examples of British, German, and American 
constitutions; these were well-known for excluding the majority of its citizens from the 
democratic processes. Many scholars also include rights provisions as an important aspect of 
limitations placed on the government, though it has also been argued that the presence of rights 
is of an empirical nature, rather than a definitional necessity (Brown 2002, 9).   
 
McIlwain (1947) observes that the understanding of constitutionalism has changed over time. 
As we can see from the few definitions discussed in this section, however, at its core, it seems 
the concept of constitutionalism centres around limitations on power. The most minimalist 
 
2 Along with the notion that “[a]ll constitutional government is limited government” (McIlwain 1947, 21). 
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definitions might then settle for just this, whereas the more maximalist definitions embroider 
on the how and the why. This is not uncontroversial either, though. Holmes (1988, 227) argues 
that “[i]n general, constitutional rules are enabling, not disabling; and it is therefore 
unsatisfactory to identify constitutionalism exclusively with limitations on power.” 
  
2.2.1 Liberal constitutionalism 
 
Liberal constitutionalism can be defined in manners that at first do not distinguish it from, let’s 
call them, “less liberal” definitions. These definitions might focus on enabling and/or 
restraining government power through the law. Whether implied or explicitly stated, however, 
is the sense that constitutionalism is something that can only happen in conjunction with 
democracy. An example of this is in how Murphy (1993, 9) describes the constitution acting 
as a guardian of rights, assessing that “[i]nsofar as it is authoritative and embodies 
constitutionalism, it must protect substantive rights by limiting the power of the people’s freely 
chosen representatives.” 
 
Liberal constitutionalism is often associated with ideas of separation of powers, democratic 
elections, and rights enforceable by law. Individual autonomy, and therefore individual rights, 
are central to this concept of constitutionalism (Thio 2012, 134). The rule of law is also a 
concept commonly associated with this type of constitutionalism. “The ‘rule of law,’ liberally 
understood, implies more than simply that all actions of the state should be legal” (Slagstad 
1988, 106). Laws must, according to this tradition of thought, be a formalization of norms, 
fulfilling specific criteria such as that of generality. Not just any command or legislative 
measure can be interpreted as proper laws. What characterises this viewpoint is the idea that 
the citizens need protection from the state, though it can be argued to presuppose an absolute 
monopoly of power by the state (Slagstad 1988, 108).  
 
There are, interestingly enough with regard to liberal constitutionalism, tensions inherent in the 
relationship between democracy and constitutionalism. “For those who believe that there is a 
conflict between constitutionalism and democracy, the tension stems from the fact that 
constitutions remove certain topics from public scrutiny and review” (Sunstein 1988, 338). 
Constitutions then constrain the will of the people. Sunstein (1988) argue there is no inherent 
incompatibility in the relationship, however, different forms of democratic conceptions and 
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understandings of constitutionalism may not be compatible. The different provisions in the 
constitution have different functions; “[w]e may distinguish, for example, between structural 
provisions and rights provisions” (Sunstein 1988, 327). Rights provisions remove subjects 
from the purview of majoritarian control, but some rights are arguably in service of democracy, 
such as the right to vote or freedom of speech and can arguably be insulated to the advantage 
of democracy. Other rights provisions can be seen as a formulation of mistrust in democracy. 
Structural provisions can potentially mitigate pathologies associated with democracy and 
improve upon its functioning by insulating politics from factional tyranny or self-interested 
dealing (Sunstein 1988, 328).  
 
2.2.2 Constitutionalism without liberalism 
  
There are many different adjectives associated with constitutionalism outside of liberal. Some 
such descriptors might be authoritarian, mixed, monarchical, illiberal, mere rule of law. What 
they have in common is that unlike anti-constitutional regimes, they do not lack limiting 
constitutive norms (Thio 2012, 136). “Generic constitutionalism” is a conceptualisation of 
constitutionalism which has constraining and empowering government through laws and 
institutions as its main objective (Thio 2012, 134). 
  
Restraints on government can come in different forms, as briefly and implicitly stated in the 
previous subsection. Both institutional rules hindering self-dealing and rights provisions 
protecting citizens from state intervention can constrain. The need for stability and credibility 
related to promises made by government are valuable in non-democratic regimes, just as they 
are in democratic regimes (Albertus and Menaldo 2013). There is also the possibility of 
regimes which might actively seek to use to law to deal with perceived challenges in ways that 
do not seem all that limited, but do follow principles of generality, publicity, prospectivity and 
respect independent judges or courts. Such regimes do not seem fully compatible with most 
definitions of constitutionalism but are not completely arbitrary or unrestrained either (Tushnet 
2013, 39).  
 
Restraint might also come about as unintended consequences of a constitution-making process. 
Constitutions, or constitutional provisions, may fail to produce intended effects, or prove to 
work quite differently from what authors envisioned (Elster 2015, 447-449). Several Arab 
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regimes have suspended constitutions, which were drafted according to their rulers’ 
preferences, as some provisions gained force in unforeseen manners (Brown 2002, 93). 
Constitutional arrangements and compromise made to forestall uprisings or revolutions have 
provided examples through history of documents having a constraining effect where this was 
not the goal of the drafters, and there are possibilities in of accidental constitutionalism within 
arrangements of institutional autonomy (Brown 2002, 103, 199-200).  
 
2.3 Conceptualizing constitutionalism 
  
As with any concept with differing interpretations, constitutionalism can be tricky to 
operationalise. Too wide, or minimalist, of an operationalisation risks landing us near the top 
of the ladder of abstraction. Such a conceptualisation would be close to useless for the purposes 
of measuring present here. Given the theoretical differences in approaches to constitutionalism, 
it is still the goal of this paper to not exclude those more minimalist definitions. This is also 
important when considering measurement; risking ending up near the bottom of the ladder of 
abstraction excludes potentially interesting cases from the gathered information. “It might be 
better to acknowledge the possibility of a plurality of constitutionalisms ranging from an 
idealized liberal constitutionalism to something short of pure authoritarianism” (Tushnet 2014, 
116). 
 
The view adopted here is therefore that the practice of constitutionalism ought to be seen as a 
matter of degrees. Chen (2014, 2) equates the achievement of constitutionalism to that of rule 
of law and therein draws on Fuller’s “morality of aspiration”, which dictates the need to always 
strive for a higher achievement of an ideal, and thus establishes that constitutionalism is also a 
matter of degree. This allows for a continuous concept, rather than a dichotomous one. While 
a dichotomy might be more frequently applied to normative considerations of constitutionalism, 
as Tushnet (2013a, 36) points out, there are possibilities of other forms of constitutionalism 
existing somewhere between authoritarianism and liberal constitutionalism. Chen (2014), for 
example, conceives of genuine constitutionalism, something which can be achieved, and 
differing types of constitutionalism, such as socialist or communist constitutionalism and 
hybrid constitutionalism, which are not fully compatible with this first type. These types of 
classifications allow for a comparison of countries with very differing practices. 
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A more minimal definition of constitutionalism then, that still encapsulates essential aspects of 
the concept, would be one of restraining and enabling government power. How constitutions 
function as a structuring of government power must be subject to an assessment of the distance 
between the text itself and its de facto environment. "[...] it is relatively easy to make a 
constitution, but more difficult to put it into practice, to implement it and be governed by it - 
which is what 'constitutionalism' is about" (Chen 2014, 1). Rather than seeking to measure 
constitutionalism directly, this thesis attempts to present an argument for starting with the 
measuring of constitutional compliance. 
  
2.3.1 Compliance as a necessary mechanism of constitutionalism 
 
The central premise to this paper is that compliance is in and of itself a useful concept when 
considering constitutional functions and the measurement thereof. What functions a 
constitution might perform, and to what degree, when it is being applied in practice might differ 
from the functions the same text could have if there was little to no de facto correspondence to 
the document. Regardless of which definition of constitutionalism is applied, there must be 
compliance for there to be any practical limitations on power present where the text has stated 
they ought to be. Otherwise, the constitution is no more than a sham (Tushnet 2014, 11).  
 
Establishing compliance might thus help in distinguishing shams from nominal or garantiste 
constitutions, even if it does not necessarily differentiate between the latter two. However, the 
delineation between sham and some form of constitutionalism might not be as clear-cut as mere 
compliance when taking into account aspirational documents. It can be argued that a 
constitution is no sham even in cases of great disparity between de jure and de facto as long as 
the polity’s leaders truly treat the document as aspirational (Tushnet 2013b, 1985).  
 
If one applies a more minimalist definition of constitutionalism, it can be presumed that the 
presence of compliance is a starting point for the achievement of constitutionalism. It is the 
mechanism through which we can start seeing degrees of constitutionalism. If a more 
maximalist approach to constitutionalism is used, the establishment of compliance is still a 
necessary, if by no means sufficient, condition, and as such measuring it ought therefore still 
be useful. Considering compliance as a necessary point of departure for constitutionalism 
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cannot help us distinguish “shamness” from aspirational documents, which must be taken into 
account when considering the measurement.  
 
The functions of a specific constitution can vary both over time and simultaneously overlap 
(Ginsburg and Simpser 2014, 8). If constitutionalism is enabling and restraining the 
government, this then contributes to other functions, such as that of the coordination device. A 
blueprint for how something operates is only to be followed if it can be assumed other 
“assemblers” also abide by the same plan. In enabling and restraining government, the 
constitution is laying out how different groups of society are supposed to coordinate. 
Compliance then becomes vital also for constitutions understood as coordination devices. 
Przeworksi (2014) describes it as a functioning as operating manuals, when constitutions 
describe actual political practice. This function of describing politics as is, is perhaps less 
limiting than constitutionalism, but will also rely on some weak form of compliance as rules 
being followed provide actual constraints.   
 
There might be the need for an additional indicator for fully measuring enabling and restraining 
government power; a measure that captures more than just a match between textual 
prescriptions and reality. I would argue that a more fully developed compliance measure (the 
construction of which will be discussed in the next chapter) might capture some of these aspects 
better and might therefore potentially be a reasonable start at operationalisation of 
constitutionalism. This is a discussion I will come back to in the concluding and overall 
remarks for this thesis.  
 
2.4 Previous, quantitative research on constitutions, de facto effects of de jure 
provisions, and compliance 
 
This section provides a review on some of the quantitative research on constitutions, with 
particular attention paid to the connection of de jure provisions and their de facto corresponding 
situations. Some of this literature provides a snapshot into studies on the effect the presence of 
de jure provisions has on de facto performance. The empirical literature on the effect of de jure 
rights provisions typically finds little effect of constitutional rights on de facto practices (Elkins, 
Ginsburg, and Melton 2016, 243). The field is not vast, nor is it as much concerned with 
compliance as it is with effects. The section detailing these studies will therefore be somewhat 
 18 
brief. The other research that will be addressed in this section consists of a few articles 
concerned with the de jure de facto “gap,” which are more central to the inquiry of this thesis. 
The remaining work fall somewhat outside these two main categories. 
 
2.4.1 Effects of de jure rights provisions 
 
The question of whether constitutions are merely parchment barriers, or if they have real 
restraining effects on government action has been investigated both from a theoretical and 
philosophical perspective, as seen in the previous sections of this chapter, but also from an 
empirical viewpoint. Research involved with measuring the effect of constitutional law on state 
repression has found evidence to suggest some rights respected by the government are 
associated with the presence of a de jure provision. Davenport (1996) finds that state use of 
censorship and political restrictions decrease when associated with the presence of freedom of 
the press and the right to declare state emergency in the constitution. Interaction effects were 
also found; press freedom and political conflict have less of a chance at seeing repressive 
measures from the state. The same finding holds for the interaction between states of 
emergency provisions and political conflict. The study observed 39 countries from 1948 to 
1982 (Davenport 1996, 636).   
 
Keith, Tate, and Poe (2009) conducted a time-series cross-section analysis over a 21-year 
period, covering 154 to 178 countries. Their study claims a decrease in state terror is associated 
with having provisions for individual freedoms (physical integrity rights), provisions for an 
independent judiciary and states of emergency provisions in place for 10 years. Specifically, 
they found public and fair trial provisions to be statistically significant, and that the right to 
strike was significant in some of the models. No other individual freedom was statistically 
significant in any way, which was summarised as “somewhat disappointing” and in line with 
previous research, as Davenport (1996) also had only found three out of 14 provisions to impact 
state repression. Judicial independence had similar results, where three of the indicators were 
significant in some of the models. States of emergency provisions, however, were mostly 
significant (Keith, Tate, and Poe 2009, 654). 
 
Chilton and Versteeg (2014) seek to test whether six different political rights impact 
government behaviour. Their hypothesis, which they find evidence to support, is that effects 
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of individual and organisational rights differ from one another. Their theorised explanation for 
this difference lies in the incentives and means available for organisations to work towards 
holding the government accountable for constitutional adherence, ensuring survival of the 
organisations. Such provisions, in contrast to the individual political rights, become self-
enforcing. The six analysed rights are the right to form political parties, the right to unionise, 
the freedom of association, freedom of religion, freedom of movement and freedom of 
expression (Chilton and Versteeg 2014, 575-576). They find that the right to establish political 
parties, freedom of religion and to unionise is associated with a statistically positive and 
significant effect on de facto respect for those rights. Freedom of association had a positive 
effect, but only became significant in some of the robustness checks. Freedom of movement 
and expression were not significant. The statistically significant rights also faced a lower 
probability of severe state restrictions when the corresponding right was present (Chilton and 
Versteeg 2014, 583). 
  
Ginsburg and Melton (2014) are, unlike the other research in this section, not concerned with 
rights provisions. The topic of their study is judicial independence. Using observations from 
the period from 1960 to 2008, covering 192 countries, they find no significant results for the 
six different de jure judicial independence variables. The focus on their study is between-
country variance, as de jure and de facto judicial independence tend to remain relatively stable 
within-country over time. With covariates removed, some associations became significant, 
with the authors commenting on a probable correlation between the independent measure and 
the control variables. When controlling for different levels of regime type, however, they found 
that authoritarian states with removal and selection procedures that increase judicial autonomy 
had an effect on the de facto judicial independence compared to other authoritarian states 
(Ginsburg and Melton 2014, 205). They further find that the effect is stronger if there are 
additional veto players who can check the executive in the processes of selecting and removing 
judges. (Ginsburg and Melton 2014, 206).  
 
Metelska-Szaniawska and Lewkowicz (2021) look at the de facto protection of constitutional 
rules in post-socialist countries in Europe and Asia, and whether de jure provisions have any 
effects on them. While there is only one significant, unconditional and positive effect related 
to the freedoms of assembly and association, they do find significantly positive effects on de 
facto rights protection conditional on political competition, judicial independence and robust 
civil society. The aggregate measure of de jure rights is also insignificant.  
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The last study included in this subsection is related to assessing constitutional performance, 
but with a slightly altered focus. Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton (2016) analyse the effect of 
constitutional age on de facto rights protection. De jure rights are accounted for, but the focus 
of the article is on testing for effects of age. They hypothesise differing effects for different 
contexts, with maturation, decay, and stasis all possible outcomes. The results indicate a 
maturation effect for rights provisions, which is at its most pronounced when age surpasses 
fifty years old, in authoritarian regimes with a relatively high degree of judicial independence, 
and in states that have performed poorly over time (Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton 2016, 265).  
 
2.4.2 The de jure-de facto «gap» 
 
“Efforts to measure constitutional compliance on a global scale has yet to materialize” (Law 
and Versteeg 2013b, 870). This observation seems to have animated the article attempting to 
assess whether constitutions were shams with regards to rights provisions. Law and Versteeg 
(2013b) use data about the content of constitutions and actual practice in corresponding 
situations to measure the distance between text and reality. They do so by assigning a score of 
1 or 0 if a particular provision is present, and by assigning 0, 0.5, and 1’s to actual practice 
across the de facto rights protections. The resulting gaps provide a measure of which states 
overperform, underperform or mostly comply.  
 
This gap is used for the creation of a typology of sham, weak, modest, and strong constitutions 
(Law and Versteeg 2013b, 883). Underperformers are the sham constitutions, which promise 
more than they deliver. Weak constitutions promise little and uphold little, whereas modest 
constitutions overperform by promising little but upholding many rights in practice. At the 
other end of this typology are strong constitutions that promise much and delivers much. Law 
and Versteeg’s (2013b) article is a massive work and has been very instructive for how the 
compliance index is formed, even if it does not mirror this gap analysis. 
 
Law and Versteeg (2013b) also run a regression on their measure, seeking to identify causes 
of constitutional compliance. They find that comprehensiveness of the constitution, a statist 
constitutional ideology, population size, ethnic fractionalisation, and civil war are all associated 
with increased violation of de facto rights. Democracy and GDP per capita, on the other hand, 
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is associated with fewer violations. Western Europe and North America also generally tend to 
be associated with fewer rights violations than other regions, particularly North Africa and the 
Middle East perform poorly relative to Western Europe and North America (Law and Versteeg 
2013b, 928-930). Characteristics of a country’s formal legal structure, interstate war, 
ratification of human rights treaties, constitutional age, common law tradition, and judicial 
review all lack statistical significance in their model. The presence of limitation clauses for 
rights are not proven to have any effect on compliance  (Law and Versteeg 2013b, 930-934).  
 
Another work of theirs, is a chapter for a book concerning constitutions in authoritarian regimes 
(see Ginsburg and Simpser 2013), where they further break down trends in compliance among 
different strains of authoritarianism. They find that both military and monarchical regimes 
adopt weak constitutions at a higher rate than civilian authoritarian regimes. Military regimes 
are also more likely to adopt modest constitutions, compared to civilian regimes (Law and 
Versteeg 2013a, 185-186). Civilian regimes then tend more towards sham constitutions as 
pertains to rights provisions. These differences show how measurements at the state-year level 
for constitutional compliance might give us ideas about causal mechanisms to explore through 
other means. For instance, why do we see this difference between strains of autocratic regimes? 
Are civilian regimes hoping for another source of legitimacy from a constitution that has more 
rights, whereas military and monarchical regimes have their legitimacy from other sources and 
thus choose to avoid the costs associated with “shamness” (Law and Versteeg 2013a, 186-187)? 
 
Another study done with a similar methodology for mapping the gap between de jure and de 
facto rights concerns post-socialist regimes and measuring determinants thereof (Metelska-
Szaniawska 2021). The findings are a strong path dependence for the size of the gap, and that 
levels of democracy, presence of political conflict, constitutional age and comprehensiveness 
of the constitution all affect the gap. Promising more rights leads to greater gaps, as does 
political conflict and increasing constitutional age, while a higher level of democracy decreases 
the gap (Metelska-Szaniawska 2021, 188-189). 
 
Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton (2009) collected the dataset that is used for de jure indicators in 
this dataset. Their book about constitutional endurance is not the only one resulting from their 
project, but it also contains very preliminary analysis of cross-sectional data to assess the gap 
between de jure and de facto rights protection and legislature power. They find that provisions 
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regarding legislative power see a higher degree of compliance than does right provisions 





3 Building an index – how to measure compliance? 
  
This chapter continues the discussion of conceptualisation, with the goal of operationalisation 
and measurement. The chapter is structured as follows. Firstly, a discussion of choices made 
in the conceptualisation for constitutionalism and constitutional compliance. The second part 
will outline which variables are selected and how they are paired to map the gap between de 
jure and de facto. The coding scheme applied is also explained. Lastly, the chapter will contain 




Any conceptualisation needs to be anchored in the empirical analysis of the phenomenon if it 
is to be anything but an exercise in semantics (Goertz 2012, 4).  
 
The elements conventionally understood to be part of an empirical concept are labels, attributes, 
indicators, and phenomena (Gerring 2012, 116). Another, closely related, way of conceiving 
of concepts are in multiple levels: theoretical definitions as a starting point, the constitutive 
dimensions of the basic concept and lastly the indicators or data (Goertz 2012, 6). The 
theoretical proposition is, for the purposes of this thesis, that constitutionalism, as a 
constitutional function, restrains and enables government power. This removes the concept 
from potential attributes, such as liberal or authoritarian, which is desirable when attempting 
to measure all states against the concept.  
 
Only restraining government is here considered as a subminimal definition, as it fails to 
recognise enabling as another essential attribute of constitutionalism. One could argue that the 
addition of this attribute would still result in a subminimal definition, given how potential 
attributes such as democratic government has been left out. My stance is rather that adding 
democracy would result in a maximalist definition, as the aim of this conceptualisation and is 
not to capture the phenomena of liberal constitutionalism. The attributes of constitutionalism 
will therefore here be considered to be the restraining and enabling of government. What is of 
importance is not where this restraining and enabling happens, in terms of specific provisions 
or parts of the constitution, but that there is a sufficient quantity of it. 
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The logic of family resemblance structure is thus applied to this concept of constitutionalism, 
though I would like to present an argument that whether one would prefer a less minimalist 
definition of constitutionalism than the one presented here, it is fully possible to restructure the 
concept and apply additional attributes or constitutive dimensions for necessary and sufficient 
conditions to be considered met. My argument would be that enabling and restraining 
government power is no matter the structure an essential part of constitutionalism, and 
functions through the mechanism of constitutional compliance. Compliance becomes a sort of 
overarching indicator for constitutionalism. This should remain constant regardless of what 
other attributes might be desirable to add into the concept.  
 
Compliance with the document is also the mechanism through which the constitution might 
function as an efficient coordination device or mission statement and is as such not exclusive 
to constitutionalism but rather its own concept, whose presence is central to measuring 
constitutionalism and other constitutional functions. What is exclusive to constitutionalism are 
the attributes of enabling and restraining government power. Or rather the attribute of 
restraining and enabling, as they are here considered to be two sides of the same coin. Setting 
out rules of say, a sport or a game, certainly limits the players but it also enables the game to 
be played at all by specifying what is allowed. As such they happen simultaneously. This might 
seem very much like an exercise in semantics, as it has little relevance to the structure of this 
concept, but is worth consideration should one seek to change the structure. 
 
Further breaking this “overarching indicator” down means identifying aspects of the 
constitution which can be considered as enabling or restraining. As such, provisions detailing 
the colours of the flag are wholly uninteresting in this context. Those might be best left for a 
study of the symbolic functions and effects of constitutions. After locating provisions 
indicating the presence of an enabling or restraining function, comes locating real world 
measures that identify whether any included article is being abided by. Compliance lies within 
this relationship of abidance.  
 
Goertz (2012, 30) assigns the task of identifying the negative pole of the basic concept, what 
occupies the middle ground between these two poles, and whether there is a continuity between 
them. If the positive is a constitution performing the function of constitutionalism, then the 
negative is understood here as a constitution performing other, or theoretically possibly no, 
functions. There is no real restraining or enabling of power through the text. “If constitutions 
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are effective, the gap between textual aspiration and performance will be small; if the gap is 
large, the constitution should be deemed ineffectual” (Ginsburg and Huq 2016, 10). A sham 
constitution, as addressed in the previous chapter, would be an apt descriptor for that negative 
pole. Furthermore, I think of constitutionalism as a matter of degrees, like others such as Chen 
(2014). These functions might be performed to a very small degree, but if they still are present 
then that is still sufficient to classify as a very low degree of constitutionalism. Drawing a clear 
line between when “shamness” stops and when constitutionalism starts is tricky, but this is 
where the concept of compliance enters.  
 
Constitutional compliance becomes a concept unto itself, necessitating a definition. I 
understand it to be the connection of de jure and de facto, and this hopefully resonates with 
how others would think of it as well as per a criterion of conceptualisation established by 
Gerring (2012, 117-119). Its’ constituent part is the matching of constitutional text and practice, 
and its’ negative pole is non-compliance. This is another matter of degrees, and the 
operationalisation of the border between the two will be addressed in section 3.2.3. In the 
conceptualisation of constitutionalism, it is compliance that acts like the border between 
constitutionalism and “shamness”. Just like all decisions inherent in this conceptualisation, the 
placement of this border could be contested. Perhaps even should. There might be an aspect of 
the constitution which fulfils a function of restraining and enabling, but if the whole does not 
qualify as a case of compliance it is disregarded. Compliance is only present if sufficiently 
many aspects of the higher law is respected in practice. It does, however, not specify which 
parts of the document need to be adhered to. This demarcates the concept of compliance as 
belonging in the structure of family resemblance (see Goertz 2012, 36).   
 
The choice of applying a family resemblance structure to both concepts is arguably necessary 
for concept-measure consistency (Goertz 2012, 95-98), as one concept functions as part of the 
measuring of the other, higher level one. If the structure of constitutionalism is changed to one 
of necessary and sufficient in order to add more conceptual dimensions, the way compliance is 
structured might also need to change. The same holds if applying a necessary and sufficient 
structure while considering enabling and restraining as two different attributes. The matching 
of de jure and de facto would probably need to be divided among the different attributes, 
depending on what types of constitutional provisions they measure. The averaging method used 
for the aggregation of the compliance measure in this thesis would certainly also lead to issues 
of consistency between measurement and concept and would require some rethinking.  
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Previous research attempting to explore the gap between de jure and de facto or measure 
“shamness” have largely centred on compliance with rights provisions (see for instance Law 
and Versteeg 2013a or b, Metelska-Szaniawska 2021). However, as has been pointed out in the 
previous chapter, constitutionalism can convincingly be argued to be about constructing as well 
as constraining. I therefore wish to provide a cursory look into compliance for other aspects of 
the constitution as well, in an argument for extending measurement to all of the constitution 
when discussing sham or compliance, its effects and/or determinants. In order to fully measure 
constitutional compliance inclusion of rights provisions is obviously imperative but does not 
paint a complete picture by itself.  
 
It has been argued that it is necessary to choose between an internal or external perspective 
when measuring constitutional success (Ginsburg and Huq 2016, 6-10). The perspective 
adopted here is an external one. The intention is for a measurement that is more easily 
comparable across polities. However, there will inevitably be a loss of information, for instance, 
what the intended functions of a constitution ought to be in the eyes of those who wrote and 
adopted it.  
  
3.2 Constructing a measurement for constitutional compliance 
 
For the purpose of creating the compliance index, I have used data from the Comparative 
Constitutions Project (Elkins and Ginsburg 2021) and from the Varieties of Democracy dataset 
(Coppedge et al 2021), as well as from the CIRIGHTS project (Cingranelli, Filippov and Mark 
2021; Cingranelli, Richards and Clay 2014). The subset of data that is utilised is limited in time 
to the years spanning 1980 to 2020 and limited in space to 175 countries. This is due to practical 
concerns related to mitigating the impact of missing data. The following section will be divided 
into three parts, where the first consists of a walkthrough of the variables selected for measuring 
de jure attributes and those chosen for their de facto counterparts. The second section goes into 
a discussion on the data available and strategies employed to mitigate problems related to 
missing data. The final part in this section of the chapter is an outline of the logic of the coding 
scheme applied to create the index.  
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3.2.1 Selection of indicators 
 
The data for de jure provisions are drawn from the Comparative Constitutions Project’s (CCP) 
third version of “Characteristics of National Constitutions” (Elkins and Ginsburg 2021). The 
dataset consists of single, multiple, and open-ended response questions detailing characteristics 
about written constitutions. The dataset also includes identifying information on constitutional 
systems and events. The data for the de facto descriptors are taken from the eleventh version 
of Varieties of Democracy’s (V-Dem) dataset (Coppedge et al 2021). The sole exception is 
data for disappearances and extrajudicial killings for a de facto measure of violations of 
prohibitions of arbitrary arrests. This data is gotten from the CIRIGHTS Data Project’s dataset 
(Cingranelli, Filippov, and Mark 2021; Cingranelli, Richards, and Clay 2014). The compliance 
measure is structured in four components and a total of twenty-four subcomponents divided 
across these components. How many subcomponents each component has is largely driven by 
data availability and consistency in the matching of de jure and de facto indicators.  
 
Table 3.1: An overview of selected de jure provisions and the indicators chosen as de facto 
correspondent, with example of coding procedures 
De jure indicator Corresponding de facto indicator 
For component regarding the executive For component regarding the executive 
Does the executive have the power to initiate 
legislation? 
0 = No 
1 = Yes 
0.5 = Not specified or mentioned in text 
 
For all indicators of executive power, both 
head of state and head of government are 
accounted for it the system has more than one 
executive. If one is in compliance, while the 
other is not, a score of 0,5 is awarded instead 
of 0 or 1.  
Does the executive propose legislation in 
practice? 
0 = Yes 
1 = Yes, but this power is shared 
2 = No 
 
Compliance coding: 
De jure is 1 and de facto is 0 or 1 = 1, 
De jure is 1 and de facto is 2 = 0, 
De jure is 0 and de facto is 0 or 1 = 0, 
De jure is 0 and de facto is 2 = 0, 
 
Does the executive hold veto power? Would the executive be likely to succeed if 
they took actions to veto legislation? 
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Can the legislature override the veto, and if 
so, with what percentage of the vote? 
Does the executive hold the power to dismiss 
the legislature? 
Can the executive dissolve the legislature in 
practice? 
Does the executive hold the power to dismiss 
ministers or the cabinet? 
Can the executive dismiss ministers in 
practice? 
Total number of subcomponents: 4 
For component regarding the legislature For component regarding the legislature 
Do the legislature hold the power to 
investigate the executive? 
Do the legislature investigate the executive 
in practice? 
Do the legislature hold the power to question 
members of the executive, or does the 
executive have to report regularly to the 
legislature? 
Do the legislature regularly question the 
executive branch in practice? 
Total number of subcomponents: 2 
For component regarding the judiciary and 
public administration 
For component regarding the judiciary and 
public administration 
Are the central judicial organs declared to be 
independent? 
Is the high court considered independent in 
practice? 
Does the constitution provide for an electoral 
commission to oversee the election process? 
(electoral courts not considered as EMBs for 
this indicator) 
Does the electoral management body have 
autonomy from the government? 
Does the constitution provide for 
meritocratic recruitment of, or non-
discrimination in the hiring of, civil 
servants? 
Are appointment decisions in the state 
administration based on personal and 
political connection, as opposed to skills and 
merit? 
Does the constitution provide for an 
ombudsman, an attorney general, or other 
related oversight bodies? 
If the executive branch engages in 
unconstitutional, illegal, or unethical 
activity, will an oversight body, other than 
the legislature, investigate and issue an 
unfavourable report or ruling? 
Total number of subcomponents: 4 
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For component regarding rights For component regarding rights 
Does the constitution freedom of assembly? Is there a right to peaceful assembly? 
Does the constitution provide for freedom of 
association? 
Is there CSO oppression by the state? 
Does the constitution provide equality for, or 
prohibit discrimination based on gender? 
Is there exclusion by gender? 
Does the constitution provide for a right to 
health care, or a state duty to provide health 
care? 
Is basic health care guaranteed to all? 
Does the constitution prohibit arbitrary 
detention or unjustified restraint? 
Were there disappearances? 
Were there extrajudicial killings?3 
 
Data from the CIRIGHTS Data Project 
Does the constitution provide for access to 
justice? 
Answered “Yes” if 4 out of these 9 
provisions are present: 
Right to a defence, or counsel, right to a fair 
trial, right to appeal, public trials generally 
required, presumption of innocence, right to 
an interpreter or language that accused can 
understand, right to speedy trial, right to 
redress, or prohibition of punishment by laws 
enacted ex post facto 
Is there access to justice for men? 
Is there access to justice for women? 
Does the constitution provide for freedom of 
movement? 
Is there freedom of foreign travel and 
emigration? 
Is there freedom of domestic movement for 
men? 
Is there freedom of domestic movement for 
women? 
 
3 Measuring unjustified detention by looking at disappearances and extrajudicial killings arguably only accounts 
for extreme cases of unjustified restraints, but these measures have also been used in other quantitative research 
regarding compliance with constitutional rights, such as Law and Versteeg (2013a).  
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Does the constitution provide for the right to 
form political parties? 
Are there barriers to forming political 
parties? 
Does the constitution provide for freedom of 
the press? 
Is there government censorship of print or 
broadcast media? 
Is there harassment of journalists? 
Does the constitution provide for a right to 
own property? 
Do men enjoy the right to private property? 
Do women enjoy the right to private 
property? 
Does the constitution provide for freedom of 
religion? 
Is there freedom of religion? 
Does the constitution prohibit slavery or 
forced labour? 
Are adult men free from servitude and other 
kinds of forced labour? 
Are adult women free from servitude and 
other kinds of forced labour? 
Does the constitution provide for freedom of 
speech or expression? 
Is there freedom of discussion for men? 
Is there freedom of discussion for women? 
Is there freedom of academic and cultural 
expression related to political issues? 
Does the constitution prohibit torture? Is there freedom from torture? 
Total number of subcomponents: 14 
Total number of provisions measured: 24 
 
Earlier research on the de jure de facto gap has primarily been centred around rights provisions 
(see for instance Law and Versteeg 2013a or b; Metelska-Szaniawska 2021). The inclusion of 
different rights in such studies have largely been decided by data availability. This is also 
largely applicable here. Choices for de jure and de facto variables have been made by many 
readthroughs of the respective codebooks. The overarching theoretical concern for variable 
choices has been the conceptualisation of compliance understood as a component of enabling 
and restraining government power. Restraining and enabling can certainly be seen in the 
inclusion or exclusion of different rights provisions, in the specified powers of different 
governmental actors, and relatedly, also in the interinstitutional checks on power. Provisions 
concerning national symbols such as flags, anthems and the like have been considered as 
fulfilling other functions of the constitution than constitutionalism, and therefore disregarded.   
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3.2.2 Impacts of data availability 
 
There are several variables I would have wished to include in the compliance index, but that I 
either did not manage to find or where the questions asked and answered for the de jure and de 
facto measurement were incompatible. An example of the latter would be for a subcomponent 
concerned with the legislature’s ability to remove the executive. The de facto measurement 
explicitly tells its expert survey to not include instances of removal through impeachment, 
while the de jure measurements are concerned with whether there are constitutional provisions 
for dismissing head of state or head of government, under what condition this can happen, and 
upon whose proposal. A quick look through the data showed that France was coded as allowing 
for dismissal of the head of state by the constitution, but not in practice. The measures are 
therefore incompatible as long as the one matching the scores together does not have 
information on impeachment-rules in every country for the entire time period. 
 
A similar problem arose for the election of head of state and head of government. The de jure 
variables only indicated whether the executive had inherited the position or was appointed 
through royal selection, elected by the citizens, or elected by an elite group. For head of 
government appointment was also an option. Comparing this to de facto indicators proved 
difficult for any country-year the executive was elected by an elite group. Arguably, the party 
in a one-party state and the legislature are both elite groups. And how would the military fit 
into this? Is a royal council an elite group or would selection by that institution qualify as royal 
selection? No matter which potential elite group selects in practice, how does one assure that 
it is the elite group specified by the constitution?  
 
Another subcomponent that got rejected was the power of the legislature to initiate legislation. 
The de jure variable asked for who could initiate legislation with multiple options available for 
the coders, whereas the de facto variable asked whether approval of the legislature was required 
for legislation to pass. Being given the power to initiate legislation does not equate to being 
required to approve for any legislation to pass, even if they are likely highly related. The 
inclusion of the right to education, as a socioeconomic right, would also have been ideal. The 
de jure variable did not include any such formulation in variables relating to education. 
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Whether the constitution contains provisions concerning education does not equal to a 
guaranteed right.  
 
Other times it proved difficult to locate relevant de facto indicators altogether. The inclusion 
of de jure term limits and de facto adherence to those would have been preferable, as this must 
be considered a measure of restraining the power of the executive. Evidence does, however, 
suggest that while attempts at avoiding term limits are very common, those executives who 
overstay their time in office often overstay through constitutional amendment or the writing of 
an entirely new constitution (Ginsburg, Melton and Elkins 2011). Since the year 2000, while a 
third of all incumbent presidents who reached the end of their term attempted to overstay, none 
did so by ignoring the constitution (Versteeg et al 2020). The absence of this variable then 
suggests the compliance scores might be lower, at least for presidential systems, than it would 
with an inclusion. 
 
Selection and removal procedures for judges is another aspect I would have liked to include in 
the measurement. These are central conceptions to judicial independence (xxx). Compliance 
with the indicator for judicial independence included in the measurement is not expected to be 
widespread. Melton and Ginsburg (2014) find evidence suggesting a higher degree of judicial 
independence where there is competition between executive and legislative powers in the 
appointment and removal processes of judges, but no such correlation for constitution 
containing merely statements of judicial independence. 
 
Other indicators that were excluded include the right to unionise (due to a very high degree of 
missing de facto data), the power to interpret the constitution, the protection of judicial salaries, 
whether courts can challenge the constitutionality of laws, whether the public can propose 
legislation, whether the public can challenge the constitutionality of laws, and rules for 
constitutional amendment. Procedures surrounding emergency powers and the existence of 
federal structures could also be of interest in a measure such as this.  
 
Another aspect of limitations to the data availability is the missing data in the datasets. There 
is data missing from the CCP dataset. Generally, this is for constitutional systems they have 
not yet coded, which means missingness across all indicators for those country-years and 
accounts for approximately 8.6 % or 582 of all observations. Some countries were missing for 
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their entire time-period, and those have been excluded from the index4. The CCP dataset 
already includes imputed data where there have been amendments that have not yet been 
reconciled by coders or documents have not been located, but not replacements of the 
constitutional system. This means that most of the missing data are due to changes to the 
constitutional system, such as replacements, not yet having been coded or a continued effort to 
reconcile coding decisions already made. Some of the subcomponents in the index are missing 
at higher rates, typically between 8.6 and 11 %, due to missingness in the various datasets. The 
subcomponent measuring compliance with prohibitions of arbitrary detentions, however, are 
missing for 19.15 % of all country years. 
  
3.2.3 Coding the distance between de jure and de facto measurements 
  
The coding scheme applied is as follows: 
 
If a constitution contains a provision, and the state abides by this provision in practice, then the 
compliance-subcomponent is coded as 1.  
 
If a constitution contains a provision, but the state does not abide by it in practice, the 
compliance-subcomponent is coded as 0.  
 
If the constitution has the provision, but only abides by it to a certain degree where this is 
qualitatively different from non-compliance, the compliance-subcomponent is coded as 0.5.  
 
If the constitution lacks the provision, or explicitly leaves it up to non-constitutional law the 
compliance-subcomponent is coded as 0.5. 
 
To illustrate the logic of this coding scheme follows an example of four different constitutions 
for one country-year, given (for the sake of simplicity) the total number of provisions measured 
is 20:  
 
Table 3.2: Illustration of coding scheme 
 
4 This applies to the countries of Yemen Arab Republic, Israel, Czechoslovakia, and South Sudan. 
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 Constitution 1 Constitution 2 Constitution 3 Constitution 4 
Provisions in 
constitution 




8 8 10 4 
How many: 
Does not follow 
(0 points) 
2 7 10 1 
How many: Not 
included 
(0,5 points) 
10 5 0 15 
Points  13/20 10,5/20 10/20 11,5/20 
Score 0,65 0,525 0,5 0,575 
   
This shows that the index awards a political system with a constitution which contains fewer 
provisions, but that manages to uphold a bigger portion of those written provisions, a better 
score than one that has a more specific document but fails to live up to the same percentage of 
provisions given. The state that performs the worst in the illustration is the one with a 
constitution containing all provisions measured for compliance (Constitution 3). It is a state 
that upholds more provisions in practice than all the others, but it also violates more of its own 
provisions than any other state.  
   
The reason omitted provisions are coded as 0.5, rather than 0, is that these instances are 
qualitatively different from non-compliance. Non-specificity does not equal a sham document. 
It ought to still be factored into the score, as more provisions would equate to more restraints 
or enabling mechanisms. Including the scores of 0.5 for non-present provisions award a lower 
score for non-specific documents than if the constitution had included more provisions (that 
were followed by the government). Applied to the opposite end of the scale, this would mean 
that a country violating a constitution containing many provisions would score worse than a 
country violating a constitution containing fewer provisions. The logic is that violating many 
provisions is worse in terms of complying, than violating some provisions and not otherwise 
being restrained or enabled. Consider Table 3.2, Constitution 1 and Constitution 4 would get 
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the same score of 0.8 if the score was calculated as provisions complied with divided by number 
of provisions present. They would score 0.4 and 0.2, respectively, if the score was calculated 
as provisions complied with divided by total number of provisions included in the index. The 
former coding strategy would equate Constitution 1 and 4 with one another, and the latter 
would consider them non-compliant.  
 
For each country-year the total score is calculated by adding together the compliance scores 
for each constitutional provision and averaging it. The result is a score between 0 and 1, 
allowing for degrees of compliance. It still enables any future use of the variable as a 
dichotomous one, as long as a cut-off point is set. It might also be worth noting, when 
considering the results presented in the next chapter, that the decision to code missing 
provisions as 0.5 creates a more centred index, than would be resulting from excluding those 
provisions a constitution does not contain. 
 
There is a theoretical possibility of an “empty” document, should none of the provisions 
measured in this index be present in one, or more, country-years5. Given the inclusion of 24 
different provisions, a score of 0.5208 would be the score achieved if a constitution were to 
only have one of the provisions measured which was then abided by6. Partial compliance with 
one provision, and the rest deemed missing would give the same score as a hypothetically 
“empty” document. This reflects the attitude that a constitution only partially abided by does 
not equal compliance. 0.5208 is then the cut-off point indicating the lowest possible degree of 
constitutional compliance based on these data. For those country-years where there were 
missing data for one or two de facto indicators this score should be some percentage points, or 
rather decimal points, higher.  
 
Awarding a score of 0.5 where a provision is somewhat followed is necessarily more difficult 
in practice than in theory. In some years, certain states will come close to following a provision, 
whereas some will come closer to failing. Both of these cases would still, arguably, fall under 
the same category in this coding scheme. There is therefore a loss of information in the 
 
5 This occurs for Bhutan for the years 1980 – 2004. Canada comes close by registering at two provisions present 
for 1980 and 1981. While Djibouti and Ghana both have three provisions for a period of years, both New 
Zealand and Australia are assessed to only have four of the twenty-four provisions for the entire timeseries.  
6 This is calculated by ((23*0.5) +1)/24. 
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simplicity of the coding choices. In order to make the choice of assigning this value as 
standardised as possible certain measures have been adopted in the subcomponent-specific 
coding schemes.  
 
For instance, most of the de facto variables used came from the same dataset (V-Dem) with a 
similar logic behind coding categories and corresponding values. A specific country-year were 
for many of the de facto variables assigned values between 0 and 4. For the compliance index, 
the choice was then made to consider a score of 4 to be in compliance if the provision was 
present. If the score was 3, then the value assigned in terms of compliance was 0.5. A value of 
2 and lower corresponds to 0 in the compliance-subcomponents. Where compliance with a 
provision is measured by combining several de facto measures, for instance when there were 
separate indicators for men and women, a score of 1 was accorded for values of either 4 and 4, 
or 3 and 4. Values of 3 and 3 resulted in 0.5, and combinations involving lower scores were 
assigned a 0. A more detailed description of the coding scheme can be found in the Appendix. 
It is important to note, however, that there will always be some arbitrariness related to the 
assignment of quantitative values for complex phenomena. Others would no doubt assign 
thresholds for compliance and partial compliance in other ways than I have, and many different 
approaches may be legitimate for different reasons. In order to be clear on what the index 
actually measures transparency in terms of coding decisions is sought. 
   
3.3 A discussion on validity, and on consequences of the choices outlined in this 
chapter 
  
Any attempt at large N-studies within the subject of constitutions and constitutionalism will 
inevitably be faced with criticism and potentially with charges of meaninglessness of the 
variables generated or analysed, due to the lack of contextual sensitivity. Within the legal 
research fields such as comparative constitutionalism and comparative constitutional law there 
are tensions between those who see constitutions as wholly unique and particular to its own 
historical, cultural, legal context and those who consider constitutions to consist of universal 
elements one can draw generalisations from (Hirschl 2014, 197). This split somewhat mirrors 
the one between relativism and positivism in the social sciences. The approach taken here is 
that any quantitative large-N project such as this might generate the most insight when seen as 
a complement to more in-depth qualitative studies. While there are many drawbacks to large-
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N approaches, they are still useful in combination with other approaches […] provided they 
acknowledge their embedded neglect of context and nuances” (Hirschl 2014, 276).  
  
3.3.1 Validity and reliability of the measurement 
 
There are certainly issues with the resulting index. Attempting to identify whether parts of text 
and reality match up will inevitably overlook differences in constitutional interpretation by 
courts, the impact of similar or related provisions in different polities, the different routes 
towards implementation, aspirations and so on. Tushnet (2014, 7-8) gives one such example of 
where interpretation gives important additional information, by referring to the U.S 
Constitution’s right to bear arms; other constitutions have been interpreted to create a right to 
bear arms even if such a provision does not exist in the texts. The U.S Constitution is then less 
of an outlier in practice than what the data sans interpretation might suggest. Other 
interpretations might bring practice into closer compliance with de jure provisions. The role of 
international and transnational laws and rulings by the adhering courts is also left behind on 
the cutting-room floor. As of now, this index lacks the information needed for a more accurate 
measurement. One advantage of the lack of information about interpretation is that the measure 
is designed in a way capable of picking up growing divergence from original text with the 
passing of time, which is a phenomenon of interest in itself (see for instance Strauss 1996 on a 
discussion of the effects of interpretations on divergence from text). To truly capture this 
evolution, however, more years ought probably to be included in the scope of the index.  
 
Certain coding decision will also affect the accuracy of the measure. Some of these will be 
discussed here. For instance, constitutions often contain limitation clauses, in fact Law and 
Versteeg (2013a, 933) find that they are universal. The argument could be made that the 
broadest types of limitation clauses, which might state that such and such right shall be 
restricted by law, might render any limitation in practice as perhaps in compliance with the 
constitution provided limitations were put forth in law. If so, there would be a lack of 
information regarding compliance within the data, and the provisions ought to be coded as not 
present. Similar, but more restrictive limitation clauses might specify for which, though rather 
broad, conditions or aims certain rights might be curtailed. Such conditions could be “public 
order,” “public morals,” or “national security.” The same argument as for unrestricted 
limitation clauses could be applied here as well. However, considering a large number of 
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provisions7 as not present, when they are in fact present, because there are limitations on their 
applicability seems ill advised. Especially so, since they are not found to be correlated with the 
respect of these rights (Law and Versteeg 2013a, 933-934). The decision was made to ignore 
the limitation clauses and code these provisions as the rest.  
 
A source of contention in the coding decisions for the index might be in the inclusion of 
provisions from the preamble. This relates to rights provisions. Preambles are typically a 
communication of how the authors of the constitution conceive of the project, the past, and the 
future. They are therefore not always considered as enforceable parts of the constitution. They 
can be, however (Tushnet 2014, 27), and as such I have coded provisions as present if they 
were coded as such in the CCP data and their articles were listed as the preamble. This might 
have led to an inclusion of provisions in the de jure data for cases where there is no sense of 
such provisions as binding. 
 
Another weakness of the research design is related to its quantitative nature. Measuring the 
contents of constitutions is very much an exercise in semantics and precise language. There is 
bound to be some disagreements with quantitative measures of constitutional characteristics 
regardless, but especially relevant here are those provisions that were labelled as “Other” by 
the CCP coders. There is uncertainty in the reliability of the coding introduced wherever a 
provision is coded as such. For those country-years I have read the comments left by the coders 
in order to categorise a provision as present or not, so as to facilitate comparison with de facto 
measurements. This is the least reproducible aspect of the research design, and as the decisions 
have not been reviewed by others, they are all the more questionable for it. Where possible I 
have consulted the constitutions for those country-years to reduce mistakes made due to lack 
of textual context, but sometimes documents have proven difficult to access. Whereas most 
constitutions in force at the moment can be found through the constitute project (Constitute 
2021), previous version are not always so easily available. In my anecdotal experience, I found 
this to be especially true for different amendments rather than for constitutions that were 
completely replaced.  
 
 
7 Law and Versteeg (2013b, 933) find that these limitation clauses are present in every single constitution for at 
least one rights provision in the year 2006. 43.3 % include a blanket clause of some kind.  
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An example of such “Other”-related decisions is the question of when freedom of the press can 
actually be considered as protected by the constitution. This decision impacts coding choices 
for the country-years in question. For most of those country-years that were coded “Other” for 
this provision, there were protections of different forms of communication. Whether something 
along the lines of “all means of communications of ideas, opinions and information is to be 
respected” can be considered as a guarantee applicable to the press is debatable. I have 
concluded that it does constitute a provision for freedom of the press for the purposes of this 
project, but if other were to replicate the index, they might decide otherwise. Arbitrary arrest 
is another example. Protection from unlawful detention, or right to habeas corpus, have been 
interpreted to also include those “Other” cases where arrests must be made in accordance with 
the law. While there has been concerted effort to treat like cases alike, at least within provisions, 
there is a reason these cases were coded as “Other” in the first place. They are difficult to 
classify. Luckily, for the sake of both the reliability and validity of the measure, they tend to 
make up rather few cases of the total8.  
 
Furthermore, it is up to the individual coders of the CCP project to add comments in order to 
clarify or expand upon the provisions they are coding. What they find relevant to include might 
conceivably vary, thus impacting what considerations I have made in the coding of cases. There 
are also instances, though thankfully rare, where I have found myself in disagreement with the 
coding decisions made. An example of that would be Mexico’s constitution, where the right to 
form political parties is coded as “Other” for the entire time period of the index. It is made with 
reference to article 54.IV, and the comment gives no reason to presume a guarantee of this 
right. In fact, it says it is left to non-constitutional law. In the document amended through 2015, 
however, article 54.IV deals with election systems for the first chamber. Article 41.I, on the 
other hand, implies this guarantee when it says only citizens can form a political party. This 
might be a case of erroneous coding, I might be misinterpreting something, or I might be 
looking at the wrong version of the document. The Mexican constitution have, after all, been 
amended 76 times in its life span of 104 years (Constitute 2021). In these instances, where I 
find myself in disagreement with the CCP score, I have defaulted to their assigned scores and 
 
8 The number of cases coded as “Other” for freedom of religion was 192 cases, among 6743 total observations. 
For property rights this number was 204. For freedom of assembly, it was 35. For access to justice, I only 
manually decided the cases in which fewer than 4 rights were present, but some rights were coded as “Other”. 
This amounted to 862 cases.  
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comments. This is because there are two coders working individually for each document in the 
CCP dataset, with a third person reconciling if there are coder disagreements, whereas I am 
working alone. Such instances do beg the question of whether my coding interpretations for 
other country-years coded ambiguously are reliable. 
 
There is also a question to be raised regarding the measurement’s capture of the concept. Due 
to issues related to data availability, there are several indicators mapping the adherence of de 
facto situations to de jure texts that were not included. To fully measure compliance in a manner 
providing conceptual validity (see Gerring 2012, 161-163) further indicators would need to be 
added. The further analysis of the index in the following chapters are therefore subject to this 
(rather large) caveat. This is a limited measure of compliance, which would require substantial 
improvement in terms of additional indicators and data before any resulting analysis can be 
validly claiming inferences based on constitutional compliance.  
 
3.3.2 Possible pitfalls and potentials of the measurement, as well as prospective    
improvements 
 
The purpose of this index, given its numerous imperfections, would first and foremost be to 
continue a discussion on how to gain more generalizable insights into constitutions across 
different political systems and time, rather than to provide any real answer to such debates. It 
is also not primarily concerned with normativity; measuring constitutional compliance is a 
normative endeavour only insofar that it ranks systems from better to worse in terms of more 
compliance to less compliance. It says little about what a constitution ought to achieve. For 
instance, the Albanian constitution of 1976 explicitly prohibits ownership of private property. 
Many would perhaps see this as an unwanted feature in their constitutional system, yet Albania 
scores 1 for the subcomponent measuring provisions regarding “Freedom of property” during 
the period this constitution was in place because ownership of private property was virtually 
non-existent according to de facto data. The exclusion of any normative assessment of what 
constitutional provisions should do can be addressed by changing the structure of the concepts 
and adding new dimensions, as mentioned in the chapter’s first section. This depends on the 
purpose a compliance index is thought to have in any research project. There are advantages to 
being able to measure purely if practice is what the text dictates it should be, such as (mostly) 
 41 
excluding a function of window dressing without excluding constitutional systems for other 
reasons. 
 
The index is not designed to account for overperformance of constitutional rights, unlike some 
previous studies on the de jure-de facto gap in terms of rights provisions (see for instance Law 
and Versteeg 2013a or b; Metelska-Szaniawska 2021). Constitutional overperformance, often 
found within states with older constitutions (Law and Versteeg 2013a, 902), within human 
rights is an important and interesting empirical phenomenon that this measure does not provide 
further information on, or analysis of. The reason for not accounting for overperformance is 
the conceptualisation of compliance applied. There is no room for anything that is not included 
in the text; ignoring the danger of repeating myself, compliance lies within the relationship 
between de jure and de facto. One should perhaps be careful to say that the constitution, or any 
single provision, can cause compliance, but constitutional overperformance suggest a causal 
mechanism outside of what is actually written in the text.  
  
Measuring the “gap” between de jure and de facto constitutions is a complex endeavour. 
Translations are famously a source of miscommunication and loss of information; comparisons 
and interpretations might yield slightly differing results depending on which languages the 
work is done in, and different translations may alter the results as well (Tushnet 2014, 6). 
Furthermore, what the compliance-score might tell us will depend on other contextual factors, 
such as the time provisions have been in place or whether they are intended to be transformative 
or preservative (Ginsburg and Huq 2016, 10-12). Any measure of constitutional compliance is 
limited in the amount of information it provides us with on its own. As such, the stance adopted 
here is that a further developed measurement of compliance becomes useful only when 




4 The compliance index – a descriptive analysis 
 
This chapter presents a cursory introduction to the data of the compliance index, through graphs 
and tables. The first section gives an overview of some of the variables produced for the index, 
before the second section delves into some bivariate relationships of the compliance index. The 
variables introduced in this first section are the compliance index, total number of provisions 
present in any given country-year, as well as components and subcomponents of the index. 
These components and subcomponents are as introduced in the previous chapter (Table 3.1). 
These relationships concern the passage of time within the measurement, the number of articles 
present, regional differences, and differences by regime type.  
 
4.1 Descriptions of the data 
 
The first variable to be presented is the compliance index. The overview contains some 
descriptive statistics regarding distribution of scores before this is illustrated in a figure. There 
is also a figure illustrating the bimodal distribution of scores should the provisions excluded, 
or perhaps more accurately non-included, in a constitution any given country-year be coded as 
missing rather than 0.5.  
 
Table 4.1 Descriptive statistics for the compliance index 
 Compliance 
Mean 0.49 
Standard deviation 0.15 
Minimum score 0.08 
Median score 0.49 
Maximum score 0.90 
Number of valid observations 6161 
Skewness 0.14 
Standard error skewness 0.03 
Kurtosis -0.48 
 
Table 4.1 presents a descriptive overview of the compliance index. Both the mean and the 
median fall slightly below what is considered compliant, with both values at 0.49. We can see 
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that there is a slight positive, and significant, skewness. The kurtosis indicates a slightly heavier 
tailed result than the normal distribution. This is confirmed looking at Figure 4.1, which shows 
the distribution of compliance scores for all the years measured for the index. 
 
As indicated in the previous chapter, choosing to code non-existing provisions as 0.5 gives a 
more centred measure, though with somewhat heavy tails according to the kurtosis-measure. 
Choosing a different coding scheme for missing provisions, for instance coding de facto 
situations irrespective of the presence of a constitutional article, would give us a bimodal 
distribution9. For an indication of what this would look like is the total frequency for different 
values for compliance when all missing-scores are subtracted from the subcomponent-scores 
(see Figure 4.2). Scores of 0.5, given whenever a provision was indicated to not be present in 
the constitution for any given country-year, is what is meant by missing-scores. There are more 
compliant observations than non-compliant, though not by a large margin, while the fewest 
observations fall in the liminal “almost”-category.  
 
Figure 4.1 Compliance across all country-years 
 
 
9 See chapter 3 for a discussion of why this approach was not followed. 
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Figure 4.3 provides a look at the different components of the index. It is worth to note the effect 
of the number of subcomponents measured for each of the four, as the category for provisions 
regarding rights (bottom-right) have many more columns and therefore much fewer 
observations for each value. This is especially true compared to the category containing articles 
concerning the legislature (bottom-left), where there are only five specific values possible. In 
terms of score-distribution, it is evidently more country-years in which there are compliance 
with provisions regarding the executive (top-left) compared to respect for provisions regarding 
the judiciary and public administration (top-right). The former skews towards values indicating 
compliance, whereas the latter skews heavily towards non-compliance. These distributions 
include observations for country-years where there is no relevant article.  
 
Figure 4.4 provides another look at the components; this by a boxplot of the distribution of 
countries within the different components for the year 2020. There is quite the dispersion, as 
can also be seen in Figure 4.3, with the median-scoring countries ending up above the cut-off 
for both the executive-component and the rights-component. The legislative-component and 
 45 
judicial-and-administration-component, however, both have their median below the cut-off 
indicating some degree of compliance. 
 
Figure 4.3 Compliance for all country-years, grouped by index-components 
 
Figure 4.4 Compliance by components, in 2020 
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The findings regarding rights-provisions seem to be somewhat in accord with some previous 
research done into the de jure-de facto gap for civil liberties. Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton 
(2009, 29-31; 53-55) provide, in a comparison of de jure and de facto parliamentary power and 
civil liberties for the year 2006, “[…] some suggestive evidence […]” about how parliamentary 
provisions better describe the realities of the regime, than do right provisions. They find that 
the actual level of civil liberties varies in a rather dramatic fashion across countries and need 
not at all correspond to de jure rights. Their measure of parliamentary powers considers a vast 
number of provisions when compared to this compliance index, as they used Fish and 
Kroenig’s index spanning 32 dimensions of parliamentary powers. This might account for the 
slightly different findings, as though the legislature-component indeed performs somewhat 
better than the rights-component, but they overall perform not to dissimilarly. Their coefficient 
of variation for all years are 0.5 for the legislature-component and 0.4 for the rights-component. 
This discrepancy in findings might be brought about by the choice to actively score the gap 
between de jure and de facto and to assign a non-zero value to country-years with missing 
provisions, rather than plotting the correlation between de jure and de facto. It might also be a 
consequence of only having data for a single year. 
 
The component measuring the executive dimension has the highest median score, and the 
highest scores associated with the entirety of its interquartile range. One point of interest for 
the dispersion around those four provisions, is Denmark’s score of 0. The Danish constitution 
is an old document, dating back to 1849, and little has changed in the provisions regarding 
executive power (Møller 2020, 46). This situation seems a good example of one of the theorised 
effects of constitutional age on compliance; as the constitution grows older interpretations of 
the text evolve and, at least in common law traditions, this could lead to an increasing 
divergence between text and legal interpretation thereof (Strauss 1996).  In the Danish case, it 
seems that a combination of stringent amendment rules, political stability and capacity, and 
enforcement of further rights by for instance EU provisions and the European Convention on 
Human Rights has disincentivised bringing the text more in line with practice. There is also an 
understanding, based on nuances in the text, that the monarch is much more restrained and does 
not actually hold power (Christiansen 2020). These nuances and interpretations are nonetheless 
lost in the translation of entire documents (without their context) to quantitative datapoints and 
into compliance scores.  
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The next figure presents all 14 sub-components from the rights-component. The frequency of 
values is subtracted by those 0.5’s indicating a non-present article. The figure shows how 
respect for citizens’ rights and liberties vary substantially according to different rights. There 
are also variations in how common the different articles are. For instance, consider the number 
of observations for the right to form political parties or access to justice against the number of 
observations for the right to property. Or that of equal access to health against freedom of 
speech or freedom of religion. 
 
Figure 4.5 The subcomponents from the rights-related component. Observations for missing 
provision subtracted from the 0.5-group 
 
 
Looking at the figure, we can see that the two articles, amongst all the rights provisions that 
are most often violated are those for protection against discrimination, or a guarantee of 
equality, based on gender, and freedom of the press. Freedom of religion, freedom of 
movement, right to form political parties and the right to property perform especially well. 
Wherever there are constitutional articles related to those rights, there is almost only 
compliance. Prohibition from forced labour is scored as 0.5 almost as often as it is scored as 1. 
As 0.5 most often translates to a rights provision being “mostly” respected in practice, and in 
this specific instance is less of an intentional violation by government and more of a failure to 
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enforce the provision10, this also seems one of the less violated articles wherever present. The 
freedoms of assembly, association and speech seem to have the most equal distribution of 
values indicating compliance or non-compliance.  
 
These findings are very much in line with the findings of Law and Versteeg (2013a, 912-913).  
They find rights associated with gender, freedom from torture and access to justice to be the 
least respected de facto, whereas freedom of religion, movement and freedom from arbitrary 
detention are often respected in practice. They also find a pretty even distribution between 
upheld and violated proportions for freedoms of association, assembly. One major divergence 
is that they find similar conditions for the right to health. This might be due to different 
measurement strategies; they have operationalised a right to health as life expectancy at birth, 
whereas I have measured “[t]o what extent is high quality basic healthcare guaranteed to all 
[…]” (Coppedge et al 2021). As they have combined freedom of the press and expression, and 
find the compliance rate to be 26.7 %, it looks like the results here do not differ too much from 
those findings. 
 
4.1.2 With frequencies for provisions present 
 
A first look at the number of provisions present in constitutions over time, seem to indicate an 
increase for every decade. This matches the expectations due to the witnessing of an increased 
number of rights provisions included in third wave constitution-making (Elkins, Ginsburg, and 
Simmons 2013). The relationship does not seem to solely be the cause of increased number of 
rights provisions recorded as present each year, though, but rather an overall increase through 




10 See Coppedge et al (2021) for the possible categories related to the de facto presence of forced labour. The 
third category was for cases where forced labour is considered “[…] infrequent and only found in the criminal 
underground. It is actively and sincerely opposed by the public authorities.”  
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Figure 4.6 Provisions measured as present, by decade. Group label indication number of 
missing country-years each decade 
 
 
As there are some quite large variations within missing country-years distributed by decade, 
there are, however, some uncertainties in connection to interpreting how the number of 
provisions constitutions tend to have, have evolved over time. With that uncertainty in mind, 
there does seem to be a trend towards comprehensiveness over time. 
 
Table 4.2 presents the frequencies for country-years falling into the quartiles of number of 
provisions present over the four decades measured. The first quartile is for those country-years 
where the constitution contains fewer than 15 of the examined provisions. The second quartile 
holds those with 15 to 17 provisions present. The third and fourth quartile encompass 18 to 20 
provisions and more than 20 provisions, respectively. In the 1980, 45.57 % had fewer than 15 
provisions, whereas this percentage shrunk every following decade. The percentage of country-
years where more than 20 provisions were present also increased through time, from 8.35 % to 
31 %.  
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Table 4.2 Number of provisions present, grouped by decade 
1980s 1 2 3 4 NA Total 
Frequency 551 338 219 101 271 1480 
Percent 45.57 27.96 18.11 8.35  100 
1990s 1 2 3 4 NA Total 
Frequency 357 391 439 301 179 1667 
Percent 23.99 26.28 29.50 20.23  100 
2000s 1 2 3 4 NA Total 
Frequency 286 382 541 458 37 1704 
Percent 17.16 22.92 32.45 27.47  100 
2010s 1 2 3 4 NA Total 
Frequency 257 411 572 557 95 1892 
Percent 14.30 22.87 31.83 31.00  100 
 
4.2 A look at compliance scores 
 
In this section attention is now turned towards bivariate correlations, such as those between 
compliance and time, compliance and regional differences, compliance and number of 
provisions present and finally, compliance and regime type. The visualisations of the data seem 
to indicate the presence of positive correlation for time, number of articles and for democratic 
regime. There are also clear regional, overall differences, though with quite a large spread 
within some of the regions. The regional differences will also be explored by the index-
components, as will the regime-differences. 
 
4.2.1 Depending on the number of provisions 
 
Looking at Figure 4.7, there seems to be a rather clear correlation and positive correlation 
between the number of provisions present in the constitution and compliance-score. In the two 
groups containing 17 or fewer provisions, more than 70 % of observations fall in the three 








In the group containing 18 to 20 provisions, 58.5 % score below compliance, whereas less than 
half (40.16 %) of the group containing more than 20 provisions fall below the minimum level 
of compliance. In this last group, the largest number of country years (36.84 %) score higher 
than 0.62 on the compliance scale. Those country years scoring lower than 0.35 still amount to 
the third largest category. The only group containing a lower percentage of country years 
scoring less than 0.35 is the group containing fewer than 15 provisions (13.09 % versus 17.29 % 
in the group with the most provisions).  
This apparent relationship could be, cautiously as there has been no multivariate analysis, taken 
as a strengthening of the theory of renegotiation put forth by Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton 
(2009); increased specificity and clarity of a constitution might facilitate and incentivise 
enforcement of the document. While these numbers tell us nothing about clarity, nor about the 
amount of detail in each provision, which is part of specificity, it does indicate that more 
rovisions occur alongside higher averages of the compliance index. Specificity is related to 
longer periods of drafting and higher costs for involved parties. If those involved with the 
drafting has committed resources into the document, they might be more willing to provide 
enforcement of it (Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton 2009, 84-88, 103-106).  
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4.2.2 Through time 
 
Figure 4.8 demonstrates an apparent relationship between time and respect for constitutional 
provisions. While 72.04 % of country-years belonged to a category indicating non-compliance 
in 1980, this shrunk to 55.78 % of country-years in the 1990. In the 2000s and 2010s, 
respectively, membership in these three groups fell to 53.30 % and 51.53 %. There is, however, 
a large portion of data missing in the first decade, which is not observable in the below figure.  
18.31 % of the 1480 possible observations are missing in the 1980s. This number also 
drastically shrinks with the passage of time, through 10.68 % and 2.17 % to 5.02 % in the 
2010s. The effect of time might then turn out to be less significant than the one indicated by 
the data and Figure 4.8. The reasons for the shifting membership structure can be theorised to 
be because of the introductions of many new constitutional systems over the four decades11, or 
new measurements uncovering compliance from a previous decade’s missing observations. 
The percentage of observations, missing or not, that fall into the fifth quintile is steadily rising 
through all decades, from 10.20 % in the 1980s to 25.48 % in the 2010s. What these overall 
trends might be due to, is another interesting question.  




11 The number of observations by the respective decades are 1480, 1666, 1705 and 1892.  
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4.2.3 Regional differences 
 
Based on previous studies (for instance Law and Versteeg 2013a, 907) there is reason to assume 
compliance might not only vary by time, but also spatially. To illustrate these relationships are 
Figures 4.9 through 4.13, where the different boxes are associated with different regions. The 
grouping by regions is done by politico-geographic association, meaning that some countries 
find themselves grouped at odds with purely geographic belonging, where the politico-aspect 
comes from characteristics contributing to regional understanding identified in studies of 
democratisation (Coppedge et al 2021; Teorell et al 2018). Examples of this is Australia, 
Cyprus and New Zealand’s membership in the Western Europe and North America group, 
Mongolia’s inclusion in the Eastern Europe and Central Asia group, and Turkey inclusion in 
the Middle East and North Africa region.  
 
As illustrated in Figure 4.9, there are indeed significant differences between the regions. 
Western Europe and North America is the most compliant region, while the Middle East and 
North Africa is the least compliant. Asia and the Pacific is the region with the lowest overall 
scores, after the Middle East and North Africa, with the most dispersion over values. South 
Korea is the second highest scorer in 2020 at 0.87, only behind Sweden at 0.90, whereas 
Myanmar is the lowest scorer with 0.18 overall. Sub-Saharan Africa scores substantively better 
as a whole, the northern part of the continent. The scores vary quite significantly there as well, 
with Cape Verde at a score of 0.72 (the fifteenth highest score that year) to Sudan at 0.21 (only 
above Myanmar). There is also considerable range within Latin America and the Caribbean 
and Eastern Europe and Central Asia, though the regions perform comparatively alike, overall.  
 
The enforcement of provisions related to the executive is shown in Figure 4.10. The decidedly 
worst-performing category is Western Europe and North America, with a median well below 
the cut-off for compliance. The best performing region might arguably be Latin America and 
the Caribbean as they have the entire interquartile range above the cut-off. They do have more 
outliers than do Eastern Europe and Central Asia, however, even if that region’s interquartile 
range stretches down to 0.5. Sub-Saharan Africa outperforms both the Middle East and North 
Africa, and Asia and the Pacific. These trends of a high degree of compliance are the inverse 
of what we see in Figure 4.11. The adherence to constitutional articles related to the 
independence of the judiciary, meritocracy in public administration as well as the existence of 
institutions such as the ombudsman capable of executive oversight and electoral commissions, 
 54 
is overall poor. Only Western Europe and North America has its interquartile range above 0.5. 
There are outliers from all regions performing within degrees of compliance, safe for the 
Middle East and North Africa, but the vast majority of countries cannot be considered to follow 
these provisions in practice. 
 




Figure 4.10 Compliance-component for the executive year 2020, grouped by regions 
 
 
Figure 4.11 Compliance-component for the judiciary and public administration year 2020, 




Figure 4.12 maps adherence to the two provisions regarding the legislature onto regional 
categories. This component sees some mixed results, though they tend to lean towards higher 
scores rather than lower, overall. There seems to be less of a regional effect for this component. 
All regions seem to contain countries ranging far away from one another in terms of scores. 
Only Western Europe and North America do not span far into the non-compliance scores; the 
poorest performing countries in this region scored 0.5 in 2020. Amongst them are the 
Netherlands, Iceland, Canada, France, Ireland, Spain and the United Kingdom.   
 
Figure 4.12 Compliance-component for the legislature year 2020, grouped by regions 
 
In terms of keeping with citizens’ rights and liberties, as seen in Figure 4.13, there are some 
marked differences between regions. The least compliant group is North Africa and the Middle 
East, where only Lebanon passed the threshold of the cut-off point in 2020. The most compliant 
bunch can be found in the Western Europe and North America group, where only New Zealand 
with a score of 0.5 and no rights provisions present fell below the cut-off. Latin America and 
the Caribbean and Eastern Europe and Central Asia following behind. There are, however, 
rather significant outliers across most regions. Eastern Europe and Central Asia has the most 
diverse dispersion of countries, with Tajikistan and Czech Republic scoring respectively 0.03 
and 0.96 each having 13 provisions. Three of the other top 10 most compliant countries are 
also found within the Easter Europe and Central Asia group: Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia.  
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Figure 4.13 Compliance-component for rights provisions year 2020, grouped by regions 
 
The Asia and Pacific group contain another two from the ten most compliant, namely Japan 
and South Korea, with respectively 12 and 11 provisions present. North Korea, the groups least 
compliant state, scores 0.14 for its 10 provisions. Sub-Saharan Africa also sees quite a spread, 
ranging from Ghana at 0.81 to Eritrea at 0.08. The median scorer in these two groups both fall 
outside of the compliance-range. The findings of considerable dispersion of scores for rights 
provisions across Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia Pacific also falls in line with previous findings, 
so is the dispersion of scores in Latin American and the Caribbean given trends towards more 
respect for rights provisions since the 1990s (Law and Versteeg 2013a, 911).  
 
4.2.4 Regime type 
 
Democracy is often considered as a determinant of constitutional compliance (X). As we saw 
in Chapter 2, it is also by some considered as a component of constitutionalism. For those that 
consider democracy as a vital part of the constitutionalist function, the exploration of the 
bivariate relationship between these two indicators will perhaps give an indication of cases 
fulfilling necessary, if not perhaps quite sufficient, conditions for classifying as 
constitutionalism. Most liberal democratic countries score well above the cut-off point for 
constitutionalism (roughly 0.52 for these data), though there are those that score below it as 
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well (France, the United Kingdom, Australia, and the Netherlands). The same holds true for 
minimally democratic countries, where most score above the cut-off, but Panama, Jamaica and 
Burkina Faso fall below. 
 
Figure 4.14 Compliance by regime type, year 2020 
 
If one is inclined towards conceptualisations of constitutionalism that exclude democracy, the 
relationship portrayed is still of interest. Liberal democracy, as understood here12, could be 
correlated with compliance due to the conceptualisation of liberal democracies as countries 
that enforce constitutional protections of civil liberties, have a strong rule of law, independent 
judiciary, as well as checks and balances seeking to minimise governmental power (Coppedge 
et al 2021). This sounds, in many ways, like an operationalisation of a de facto measurement 
for restraining government power. It is not far from the conceptualisation of the de facto effects 
a constitution must have to fulfil the compliance-condition for constitutionalism. Fitting the 
values onto a framework of electoral democracy instead (Coppegde et al 2021)13, we see the 
same general trends, but with some adjustments to the boxes position. The figure can be found 
in the Appendix. For the remainder of the figures in this section, liberal democracy has been 
 
12 The measure used is the V-Dem Liberal Democracy Index.  
13 The measure used is the V-Dem Polyarchy Index. 
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exchanged for electoral democracy to limit the potential for conceptual overlap of the 
indicators.  
 
Figure 4.15 Compliance-component for the executive year 2020, grouped by regime type 
 
The executive-component shows a fascinating correlation, where autocratic regimes by no 
standard can be considered the category with the lowest level of compliance. This might serve 
as further empirical indications that the theories regarding constitutional functions and whether 
some form of constitutionalism might exist even in non-democratic states. There is a general 
need, across regime types, for coordination among actors, which could arguably be what we 
are witnessing in Figure 4.15. Ginsburg and Simpser (2013, 2) argue the function of 
coordination provide means through which authoritarian constitutions ought not always be 
considered “sham” documents. In order to provide coordination among elites, there needs to 
be some form of compliance, or a function of existing as operating manuals as described by 
Przeworksi (2013). “While authoritarians and democrats may differ in the precise character of 
the commitments they wish to undertake, the basic modality of entrenching certain policies to 




Figure 4.16 Compliance-component for the legislature year 2020, grouped by regime type 
 
When it comes to the legislature-component, however, the autocratic group of countries have 
the lowest level of adherence to the provisions. There are a number of outliers, resulting in a 
few rather high scores for countries such as Eritrea, Iran, Thailand, Iraq, Mauritania and Bolivia, 
to mention a few. The most interesting pattern that occurs in this component is arguably the 
identical positioning of the boxes for the other three levels of democratisation.  
 
Figure 4.17 shows a correlation more along the lines of the overall compliance scores across 
regime types. As do Figure 4.18. There are still quite a few outliers, and some very heavy ones 
in the democratic regime category, with Dominican Republic at 0 and Sweden with the overall 
highest score at 0.875. The rights-component is structured in a similar way, but with overall 
much higher scores. Whereas both categories of democracy had their interquartile range below 
0.5 in the judiciary-and-administration-component, in Figure 4.18 they are both much higher 
than both 0.5 and the cut-off mark. A few outliers fall below compliance with citizens’ rights 
in the democratic regimes in 2020, such as Brazil, El Salvador, Guinea-Bisseau, Sri Lanka, 
Nepal, Nigeria, and Indonesia. There are also those from the two autocratic categories that 
make it over the cut-off score, even if most countries belonging to these two regime types are 
non-compliant in terms of rights provisions. Among these are Gabon, Lebanon, Bolivia, and 
Tanzania, as well as some outliers visible in the figure. 
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Figure 4.17 Compliance-component for the judiciary and public administration year 2020, 
grouped by regime type 
 
 




Democracy can be seen to correlate with compliance overall. It is often considered as a 
predictor of compliance, though this relationship might need some revision if the tendencies 
seen in Figure 4.16 and especially Figure 4.15 can be believed to be more than merely 
correlational. The constitution might in turn be a facilitator of constitutional democracies; 
securing rights which enable an independent media and civil society, and then mitigating 
coordination problems amongst those seeking to enforce it (Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton 2009, 
77). This is not to say, however, that all non-democratic regimes necessarily violate their 
constitutions. Mauritania, for instance, scores 0.58 while being considered as a closed 
autocracy. The median score for countries belonging to the electoral autocracy-category will 
also score above the cut-off, though barely.  
 
There can be considerate costs associated with making empty promises, and other functions 
constitutions perform, such as coordination, depend on some level of compliance with the 
higher law (Law and Versteeg 2013b, 166). In cases where authoritarian elites write 
constitutions containing many rights, they are at once depriving themselves of a coordination 
device, while potentially giving one to regime opponents. Even among authoritarian countries 
there are different approaches taken to the function a constitution is thought to perform, and 
evidence suggests military and monarchical authoritarian regimes tend to provide fewer rights 
provisions than do civilian and party-based authoritarian countries (Law and Versteeg 2013, 
186b). The general spread within the categories indicate that these relationships and internal 






In the previous chapter some preliminary analysis of the compliance-index and some potential 
bivariate relations were visually presented and commented upon. This chapter seeks to further 
explore some of these relationships, as well as to identify other predictors of compliance. The 
following section will explore determinants of constitutional compliance, among them 
democratic level, economic development, comprehensiveness of the constitution, country-level 
variations, constitutional age, level of civil society participation, population size and judicial 
independence. The second section concerns the method of analysis, which is a multilevel model, 
and the underlying assumptions. Lastly follows a discussion of the results from the model 
specification. 
 
The choice of method needs be anchored in the research question, which for the purposes of 
this chapter will be what are likely predictors of constitutional compliance? To account for 
variances between countries and for the longitudinal structure of the data, a multilevel method 
is applied. The choice of method is further explained in section 5.2.  
 
5.1 Determinants of constitutional compliance 
 
The chapter’s analysis concerns the potential relationship between the compliance measure 
generated and an increased number of provisions present in the constitutional text. There will 
obviously be uncertainties associated with any regression results, as the compliance index 
cannot be seen as a complete measure of constitutional compliance. There are many indicators 
excluded from the creation of the compliance measure, especially for provisions that do not 
involve the rights of the citizens. The index does, however, give us a quantitative view into 
some aspects or parts of constitutional compliance, and any findings might provide a direction 
for further inquiry with ameliorated measurements.  
 
Many of the determinants listed in this section come from the literature on human rights 
violations by states, or non-compliance as concerns rights provisions. This is in large part due 
to the direction previous quantitative research has taken in this field. As many of the 
subcomponents of the index assess the performance of rights provisions, it does not seem 
unreasonable to expect previously identified determinants to play some role in predicting 
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compliance scores either. Some of the relationships might not, however, apply the same way 
to the structural provisions. It is uncertain if the so-called “usual suspects” (see for instance 
Chilton and Versteeg 2014, 582; Keith, Tate, and Poe 2009, 648) perform as they would be 
expected to, had the compliance index only included rights provisions. The analysis might give 
us an interesting glimpse into potential associations between compliance for increased parts of 
the constitution and determinants of de facto rights protection.  
 
5.1.1 Comprehensiveness of the constitution 
 
The comprehensiveness of the constitution is here measured by the number of provisions 
present in any given country for any given year. The variable is a result from the development 
of the compliance index, and its’ data therefore from Elkins and Ginsburg (2021). Elkins, 
Ginsburg, and Melton (2009) develop a theory on the role of specificity for constitutional 
survival, comprised of both the number of topics (scope) and amount of detail included. Their 
theory posited that larger degree of specificity typically meant a longer constitution-making 
process, which reflected to some degree different actors’ commitment to the constitutional 
bargain. A constitution of more scope would mitigate problems of unsolved coordination or 
hidden information, and be overall more self-enforcing than less specific documents (Elkins, 
Ginsburg, and Melton 2009, 84-87, 103-106).  
 
Law and Versteeg (2013a, 929) and Metelska-Szaniawska (2021, 189) find, on the other hand, 
that comprehensiveness of the constitution is associated with fewer rights upheld in practice. 
The operationalisation of comprehensiveness utilised in those studies are a measure of the 
number of rights a constitution includes, but also a distinction between which countries 
promises “generic rights” and which countries also promise “esoteric rights” (Law and 
Versteeg 2013a, 927). For this measure of constitutional comprehensiveness, level of 
democracy, GDP per capita and constitutional age were considered as determinants (Metelska-
Szaniawska 2021, 187).  
 
The prediction for the relationship might then both be negative and positive. Both seem very 
plausible. More provisions promised gives more occasion for failure, but few provisions 
promised can make high scores less attainable. Given that my measure is an imperfect capture 
of both these versions of comprehensiveness, it might not match either. The results from the 
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bivariate, visual analysis from the previous chapter, constitutional provisions seemed 
positively correlated with a higher degree of compliance. Yet, to achieve scores approximating 




There are two variables used to capture the measurement of time in the analysis. One is the 
indicator for year in which an observation takes place. Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton (2016, 
258) find that protection of rights has decreased over their time-period of study, which is the 
1980s until the beginning of the 2010s. They theorise this is due to increased measurement, 
rather than increased state repression.  
 
The other variable measuring time is the age of the constitution. The indicator is created from 
the CCP data (Elkins and Ginsburg 2021), where the year of promulgation for a constitutional 
system is subtracted from the year of any given observation. There are inevitably problems 
arising from attempting to measure constitutional age, with regards to what qualifies as 
resetting the number to 0. Amendments can sometimes radically change a document, in such a 
way that it ought to be classified as a new system. Likewise, replacements can provide 
startlingly similar documents to their predecessors. There seems to be at least evidence 
suggesting amendments cover more of the same topics (97 % match) than do replacements (81 % 
match), even if there is less knowledge on substantial differences within those topics (Elkins, 
Ginsburg, and Melton 2009, 55-59). As such, the operationalisation of constitutional age is 
time since replacement in this analysis. There are some country-years where there is no year 
of promulgation for the constitutional system. For some countries this seems to be because 
there is no constitution in force those years. For others it seems this is due to the suspension of 
the constitution.  
 
Two countries had values indicating it had a non-suspended constitution in place: Norway and 
the United Kingdom. The dataset does not go back further than 1789, so there is no possibility 
of a value indicating a new constitutional system for the British as the Magna Carta dates to 
the 1200s. The introduction of age in terms of the British constitutional system also seems 
daunting, both for the purposes of statistical modelling and for classifying such an exceptional 
case in the world of constitutions. While the Norwegian constitution presents an outlier as one 
 66 
of the oldest written constitutions still in force, the British system presents an absolute extreme 
outlier. The Norwegian constitution, unlike the British, is fully contained within the dataset. 
The first year of the constitutional system was coded as an amendment, rather than a new 
constitution. This is probably due to coding rules, as it is specified that the latest event in any 
given year is the one coded, and there was indeed constitutional amendment in the first year of 
the Norwegian system (Stortinget 2020). There is, however, another variable, indicating 
whether multiple events have taken place any given year. This is the case for Norway in 1814. 
This country-year is also the only for which amendment and multiple events have been coded 
simultaneously. I therefore chose to add the information of this constitution to the variable 
measuring age, while feeling confident that this is a relatively isolated case. 
 
The theorised relationship between age and constitutional compliance is somewhat involved. 
Constitutional age might contribute to a decrease in compliance, as interpretations of the text 
evolve (Strauss 2010), as found in some research (Metelska-Szaniawska 2021, 188-189), while 
no significant relationship was found by others (Law and Versteeg 2013b, 929). Another way 
to see the relationship is to assume it has the opposite effect. Instead of a decrease, it might 
increase in fit as it grows into its aspirations. The consequence of increasing age, found by 
Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton (2016), is a maturation effect and especially so in autocratic 
regimes. There seems to be two predicted outcomes for the variable of age then, each in the 




One huge indicator of variance in compliance scores is spatial context. Different social, 
political, historical, and cultural contexts dictate both the contents of the constitution and the 
de facto circumstances, giving rise to very different scores among countries as seen in some of 
the graphic representations of the data in the previous chapter. The effects at play in a specific 
country is, however, not of particular interest. Therefore, these differences will be accounted 
for by allowing for within-country variance in the model. Data on countries come from the 





“[…] studies have consistently found a link between democracy and government violence” 
(Chilton and Versteeg 2016, 582). Poe and Tate (1994) find a strong association between 
democracy and a lower level of rights repression by governments. They theorise the effects is 
due to the very real possibility of ouster of any political leader seeking to curtail or abuse 
human rights. Democracy is consistently included in analyses of the effect of and on rights 
provisions (see for instance Chilton and Versteeg 2016; Davenport 1996; Fox and Flores 2009; 
Metelska-Szaniawska and Lewkowicz 2021). The relationship between the compliance index 
and democracy is expected to be positive, primarily due to the findings in previous research 
concerned with predictors of de facto rights protection but also due to the bivariate 
visualisations from Chapter 4. The data for the democracy variable is the Electoral Democracy 
Index from the V-Dem dataset (Coppedge et al 2021).  
 
5.1.5 Civil society engagement 
 
The presence of a strong and organized civil society is often theorised to perform a function of 
enforcement. This is due to non-governmental organisations capabilities, alongside accessible 
communication channels, of providing information to the general public of breaches to the 
constitutional bargain. It is also in their own self-interest to work towards the ensuring of rights 
that enable their own functioning, and they might do so both through pre-emptive actions or 
reactively (Chilton and Versteeg 2016). Their presence thus function as a disincentive for 
governments preferring non-compliance (Ben-Bassat and Dahan, 170). They perform functions 
such as those of other accountability structures, such as the judiciary or independent agencies. 
 
In order to measure a strong civil society, the civil society participation index from V-Dem is 
used. The index “[…] is designed to provide a measure of a robust civil society, understood as 
one that enjoys autonomy from the state and in which citizens freely and actively pursue their 
political and civic goals, however conceived” (Coppedge et al 2021). The effect of civil society 
engagement on compliance is, through the mechanisms mentioned above, expected to be 
positive.  
 
5.1.6 Economic development and population size 
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From studies on human rights (see for instance Poe and Tate 1994), there have been established 
links between wealthier countries and fewer human rights abuses, though the effects were 
found to be more modest than those of democracy and conflict. The lack of economic growth 
is thought to lead to unstable regimes, more prone to rights violations. Growth, however, might 
alleviate scarcity of resources, leading to a lesser need for repression. It might also, if it is of a 
rapid nature, create instability which again leads to more repression (Poe and Tate 1994, 857-
858). It could also be argued that the economy and constitutional compliance has a reciprocal 
effect, wherein compliance further incentivises investments and growth, regardless of the level 
of democracy in the regime (Albertus and Menaldo 2014). 
 
The expected effects are, because a measure of development rather than growth is used, a 
positive effect on compliance. Economic development is here measured by an indicator for 
GDP per capita. The indicator is accessed through the V-Dem dataset, and uses data from the 
Maddison Project Database (Bolt and van Zanden 2020; Bolt et al 2014; Coppedge et al 2021). 
 
Population size is expected to correlate negatively with compliance. It is theorised that larger 
populations might create more opportunities for or cases of repression so to speak, and a larger 
population is thought to increase the burden on national resources which potentially destabilise 
political rule and therefore incentivises violence by the state (Poe and Tate 1994, 857). Data 
on population size is from World Bank Development Indicators (2019), accessed through the 




Involvement in violent conflicts is now seen as one of the “usual suspects” when it comes to 
affecting regime repression, and it is found consistently as a significant predicator of violence 
by the state (Hill and Jones 2014). Violent conflicts may also by many of the same mechanisms, 
at least those relating to capacity, be thought to influence compliance with other aspects of the 
constitution as these forms of violence often pose threats to and exerts pressure upon those 
occupying government offices. The indicator of conflict is a measure of civil war from Haber 
and Menaldo (2011), accessed through the V-Dem dataset (Coppedge et al 2021). Civil war is 
expected to have a negative effect on constitutional compliance.  
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5.1.8 Judicial independence and government adherence to judicial decisions 
 
Judicial independence is widely considered to be a determinant of a small gap between de jure 
and de facto (Chilton and Versteeg 2016, 582). Metelska-Szaniawska and Lewkowicz (2021) 
find that relatively higher judicial independence affects, in a positive manner, the de facto 
enforcement of rights. An independent judiciary provides the capabilities of enforcing 
constitutional articles, and therefore operates as a condition for compliance. It requires 
implementation of judicial decisions, regardless of whether these decisions are in the interests 
of the implementors (Voigt, Gutmann, and Feld 2015). It should be noted that the judiciary is 
not the only actor capable of solving the commitment problem on behalf of the government; 
independent agencies, such as public prosecutors, can also fulfil such functions (Voigt, 
Gutmann, and Feld 2015, 199).  
 
Judicial independence is both sought after by political leaders, as the presence of such solves 
problems of credibility on behalf of the government, but it is also unwanted when the wishes 
of political leaders run contra to the rulings of the courts (Feld and Voigt 2003). The expected 
effect of a higher level of judicial independence is therefore a higher level of compliance with 
the constitution. It might also be of note that by acting as an enforcer of the constitution, de 
facto judicial independence is also associated with facilitating economic growth (Feld and 
Voigt 2003; Voigt, Gutmann, and Feld 2015), which is another one of the determinants of 
rights compliance, suggesting these processes feed into each other.  
 
In order to control for level of judicial independence, two indicators are included in the analysis. 
These are indicators of expert measurements for high court independence and compliance with 
the high court (Coppedge et al 2021). The indicator for high court independence asks for how 
often the court rules in favour of the government in cases deemed important to the government, 
but only when these rulings are thought to go against the court’s own view of the law The 
indicator for compliance with the high court covers the other side of this relationship by asking 
how often “[…] the government complies with important decisions of the high court with 
which it disagrees” (Coppedge et al 2021). 
 
5.2 Multilevel timeseries cross-section analysis 
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Multilevel analysis, sometimes called mixed models or hierarchical models, refer to a form of 
analysis aiming to take context of different levels into account (Robson and Pevalin 2016, 6). 
It allows us to study effects that vary within and across groups (Demidenko 2013, 4; Gelman 
and Hill 2007, 6; Western 1998, 1233). Classical assumptions in statistics involve observations 
being drawn from the same general population, being both independent of one another and 
identically distributed. Multilevel analysis provides methods of analysis where these 
assumptions cannot be met (Demidenko 2013, 1). They are typically associated with less 
stringent demands, such as being capable of handling partially missing data, unbalanced data, 
and nonstandard intervals in time between measurements (Brown 2018, 496). 
 
Analyses assuming multilevel structures can be used for multiple observations nested within a 
single object, making it a relevant form of analysis for longitudinal data where one is concerned 
with structure and predictors’ change over time (Luke 2004, 62-63). An assumption of 
longitudinal data nested hierarchically allows for simultaneous modelling of change within an 
individual and differences in change within time across individuals (Finch, Bolin and Kelley 
2014, 100). For longitudinal pooled data, multilevel models can conceive of cross-sections as 
nested within time-periods, or as time-periods nested within cross-sections (Raffalovich and 
Chung 2014, 211). Multilevel analysis in terms of time, however, can be considered as non-
nested, or crossed, when individual observations are nested within levels that are not of a clear 
hierarchical nature (West, Welch and Galecki 2014, 369). Examples of these non-nested 
structures include country-year within both country and year in timeseries cross-sectional data 
(Gelman and Hill 2007, 243-244).  
 
The structure of the data then seems applicable to both a non-nested, or crossed, multilevel 
model and to a hierarchical nesting of years within states. The assignment of variables to 
different levels of a structure can, in reality, be somewhat unclear (Hox 2010, 7). What structure 
is applied to the data seems more indicative of researchers’ perceptions and intentions than of 
any inherent properties in the data (Raffalovich and Chung 2014, 211). Applying an 
understanding of non-nested or crossed levels, we would expect the years and states measured 
to have independent, linear effects on compliance. For a nested level-structure, we might expect 
that the effect observations within time have on compliance is completely dependent on states. 
A nested structure sees country-year observations within country, thereby accounting for the 
passing of time within level two units, whereas the non-nested structure sees country-year as 
nested within two different level two groups simultaneously.   
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Figure 5.1 illustrates an argument for why time itself ought not to be considered as nested. 
Each value of the time-variable occurs within every value of the country-variable. The 
relationship is crossed, rather than nested. Each value of the country-variable, however, 
corresponds to only one value on the variable identifying regions. This is a nested structure, 
and as such ought to be modelled that way if region was included in the analysis.   
  
Figure 5.1 Illustration of nesting structures 
 
 
There are theoretical, empirical as well as statistical reasons for applying an understanding of 
the data as structured within multiple groups (Luke 2004; Robson and Pevalin 2016). 
Multilevel analysis is better equipped for modelling the effects of predictors existing at 
different levels (Gelman and Hill 2007, 7; Robson and Pevalin 2016, 7; Finch, Bolin and Kelley 
2014, 100). If we can reasonably assume a multilevel structure among the dependent variable 
and relevant predictors and thereafter apply multilevel analysis, we might avoid errors such as 
ecological or atomical fallacies (Robson and Pevalin 2016, 4-6).  
 
From a theoretical standpoint, the data should be considered as multilevel due to the assumed 
varying effects within the passage of time or within differing countries. The empirical data 
indicates a variance within time and within countries for the index, as shown in the previous 
chapter, which further justifies considering the data as a multilevel structure. The reasons for 
choosing a form of analysis considering the multilevel structure of the data are, as shown, 
manifold. One of the most important statistical reasons is the assumption of independence for 
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OLS regression. "This assumption essentially means that there are no relationships among 
individuals in the sample for the dependent variable once the independent variables in the 
analysis are accounted for" (Finch, Bolin and Kelley 2014, 23). There is no reason to assume 
compliance scores are unaffected by grouping within time or country. Scores from one year 
will likely be correlated to scores from the previous or following year. Variables other than the 
dependent are also likely to be influenced by country or time groupings. Population size will 
most likely be strongly correlated within a country, as will GDP per capita. We can therefore 
assume a violation of this assumption and resulting incorrect estimates of standard errors or 
spurious significant results (Hox 2010, 3). Effects of particular predictors may also vary in 
their effect in different contexts, which is something multilevel analysis allows for (Robson 
and Pevalin 2016, 8-16). 
 
5.2.1 Specifying the model 
 
In order to address the statistical basis for analysing the data using a multilevel structure an 
empty model has been tested for its intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC), and models with 
different specifications in terms of random and fixed effects. The first model has both year and 
country as varying intercepts. The second model has year as a fixed effect, whereas the 
intercept for country is allowed variation. The other predictors will be held as fixed terms both 
models.  
 
Empty models with varying intercepts for year and for country, for only year and for only 
country gave different indications that within-time variance might or might not be a good 
explanatory variable. Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC) and Bayesian Information 
Criterion (BIC) values for the model that included both random intercepts indicated that to be 
the preferred model, as they were lower than for the other two empty models (Hox 2010, 92-
93). The likelihood ratio test of the same model was statistically significant at the 0.001 level, 
also indicating that there are indeed varying effects of both time and space at play. The ICC 
for the model is at 0.811. When checking the other two models, however, country-varying 
intercepts had an ICC of 0.797, while year-varying intercepts had an ICC of 0.015.  
 
This is an argument against the inclusion of time as a level two grouping. The alternative would 
be to simply nest country-years in countries, which does account for the effect of time within 
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states. However, as these are mostly considered guidelines rather than absolute rules, because 
the AIC and BIC results indicate a preference for models with year modelled as a varying effect, 
and because of the recommendations of Barr et al (2013), time is kept as a level two group. 
Barr et al (2013) argue that identifying maximal random effects structures should be considered 
as best practices. Models lacking random effects when they can be theoretically presumed to 
be there will through unaccounted-for variation reduce the power of the tests on the effect of 
interest. Exclusion of random slopes can lead to a confounding of effects, leading to increased 
risk of Type I error (Barr et al 2013, 261). In order to truly follow this advice, the addition of 
random slopes into the models might have seemed like a good choice, but as there are no clear 
theoretical reasons to expect varying slopes for these relationships this has not been pursued.  
 
To compare different models and decide on final specifications, AIC, BIC and likelihood ratio 
test are used, as deviance is preferred for testing nested-models and AIC and BIC is preferred 
for testing models that are not nested (Hox 2010, 47-50). One model is fitted with the lme4-
package and the other with the nlme-package in R, with a further discussion on reasons for this 
in the section on regression assumptions. The two models that were specified with this method 
are contrasted to two fully specified models, one with only varying intercept for country and 
another non-nested one, containing all the theoretically chosen predictors discussed in the first 
section of the chapter.  
 
While the specification of fixed effects was done with maximum likelihood estimation (ML), 
the rest of the specifications were done with restricted maximum likelihood estimation (REML). 
REML include only variance components in the likelihood function, while the regression 
coefficients are measured in a second step. REML estimate variance components after 
excluding fixed effects from the calculation, which leads to less bias than for ML (Hox 2010, 
41). ML is used for specifying the fixed terms of the models as regression coefficients are 
included and a chi-square test based on likelihood can then assess models with differing fixed 
effects (Hox 2010, 41). The difference between the two estimation-techniques becomes very 
small for larger groups at the second level (Finch, Bolin, and Kelley 2014, 36). 
 
Because of the differing, theorised effects of constitutional age and comprehensiveness, a test 
was run to determine the linearity of the relationship between these predictors and the 
dependent variable. As seen in Figure 5.1, the effect is clearly curvilinear. The effect of age on 
compliance is similarly curvilinear, just with the opposite trend. As the constitution ages there 
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seems to be a positive correlation with compliance, until it turns and becomes negative. A 
figure of this plot can be found in the Appendix. A model specification including squared terms 
for age and total number of provisions will be included.  
 
Figure 5.1 The effect of comprehensiveness on compliance 
 
 
5.2.2. Underlying assumptions 
 
There are several assumptions underpinning multilevel analysis. One of which is the violation 
of independently distributed error terms. This has already been addressed, with the intraclass 
correlation coefficient indicating a high level of correlation within the error terms, as expected 
due to the clustering of data within time and within countries. Other assumptions of multilevel 
modelling usually follow assumptions of linear regression analysis (Hox and Meij 2014, 171). 
Different assumptions will be addressed after a short discussion on the appropriate number of 
groups in multilevel models. 
 
There are discussions within the literature concerning the number of groups and observations 
necessary for the estimates of a multilevel model to be considered as reliable. The 
recommended number of groups by different scholars can be 10, 30, or 50, or recommendations 
might not centre on a specific number so much as an understanding of the importance of the 
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number being “large” (Robson and Pevalin 2016, 27). A low number of groups need not 
necessitate an abandonment of a multilevel structure, as predicators still exist on different 
levels and the advantages of the method therefore still holds. What is important is to be aware 
of potential estimation biases in the level two variables that result from smaller group numbers 
(Robson and Pevalin 2016, 27; Stegmueller 2013). The number of level one units within the 
level two groupings are considered to be of less importance (Robson and Pevalin 2016, 27).  
 
Data in the compliance index contains 41 groups if grouped by years, and if grouped by 
countries contains 175 groups. An empty model with a random effect for countries nested 
within region was tested as Stegmueller (2013, 753) find evidence that for multilevel models 
containing large numbers of individual-level observations only, estimates remain robust even 
when group-level sample sizes are small14. This could potentially provide reason to expect that 
even when grouping countries within regions, given that there are no explanatory variables at 
that highest level, problems of estimation bias would not severely affect the analysis. As the 
empty model with random effects for non-nested year and country was preferable, however, 
there seems no reason to believe the group numbers are too small. Given identical AIC, BIC, 
deviance, and log likelihood numbers for the model nesting country within region and the 
model excluding region, there seems to be no additional within-regional variance, that is not 
already explained by within-country variance.  
 
5.2.2.1 Assumptions of absence of autocorrelation 
 
The typical assumption for multilevel modelling is that the covariance of errors is independent. 
This assumption should not be assumed to hold for multilevel modelling for longitudinal data 
(Luke 2004, 70-71). There is already reason to suspect that the error terms might be 
autocorrelated, due to the clustering of the first level of data within the second level. A Durbin-
Watson test is performed, and as it is statistically significant, there indeed seems to be a 
violation of the assumption of autocorrelation among the residuals. 
 
A way to address the problem of the covariance structure is by changing this structure in the 
calculation of the models. Only the nlme-package, and not the lme4-package, is capable of 
handling this however (Finch, Bolin, and Kelley 2014, 96). To address the autocorrelation, an 
 
14 This finding held for 5 groups at the second level 
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additional model was therefore fitted using lme. The first model was fitted with lme4’s lmer 
function, as that model can fit non-nested models. The second model therefore has no random 
intercept for year, but as the ICC indicated year might not be a relevant second level group this 
might provide and interesting contrast to the model which still includes that varying intercept. 
 
Autoregressive error structures are popular when analysing longitudinal multilevel data, as 
there is an assumed higher degree of correlation for observations closer together in time (Finch, 
Bolin and Kelley 2014, 96). The autoregressive error structure is both less restrictive than an 
assumption of a homogenous error structure, and more restrictive than the assumption of 
unstructured or unrestricted covariance structure. An autoregressive structure is more 
parsimonious than the unrestricted structure, while not as often a violated assumption as that 
of a homogenous structure (Hox 2010, 99-103; Luke 2004, 71). As such, the model is fitted 
with an autoregressive error structure. It seems theoretically reasonable to expect such 
behaviour from the data; compliance scores for a country are likely very correlated to the 
compliance score of that country a year previous. This assumption holds true when testing, as 
the phi coefficient for the correlation structure is 0.91, indicating almost a perfectly correlated 
relationship.  
 
5.2.2.3 Assumption of homoscedasticity, absence of multicollinearity, and of linear 
relationships for the residuals 
 
“As with an OLS regression, a mixed-effects model assumes that our residuals are normal and 
randomly distributed around zero, and that no particular observation exerts undue influence” 
(Brown 2018, 512). There are many ways of checking for normal distribution of the residuals; 
the relationship between the actual residuals and theoretic, as inspected in a visual plot, seems 
relatively alright. The distribution of residuals in the models accounting for the autocorrelation 
of the error terms are visibly closer to normality than are the two non-nested models. 
Distribution according to a normal curve show that the two non-nested models have high 
kurtosis for their residuals, which does not seem to affect the other two models who again are 




Figure 5.2 Some visualisations of assumptions for model 3 
 
Visualisations for the other models can be found in the Appendix. 
 
In accounting for the linearity assumption, residuals have been plotted against fitted values, 
where the expected behaviour is for the residuals to be relatively evenly and randomly placed 
around the average value of 0 (Hox 2010, 24). Here the relationships seem flipped from the 
inspection of residual normality.  For the two models accounting for autocorrelation, there does 
seem to be some increased deviation from linearity. The values are slightly more above the line 
than below for higher fitted values. Overall, the distribution is hopefully not too problematic. 
The assumption of homoscedasticity for the residuals sees an equal, slight trend away from the 
line in the higher values for the two nested models. For the two non-nested models the 
assumption of homogeneity of variance is considered met.  
 
Multicollinearity was a problem due to a lack of centring for the provision-variable. The VIF-
test showed it disappeared after a correction of those variables, with the highest value across 
all four models being 3.05. In the full specification of the model with a random intercept for 
country there was a collinearity-issue with the variable for the number of provisions present 
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even after centring, and so that variable was left out of the model. A quadratic term for number 




Table 5.1 Regression-results for all four models 
 Non-nested models Nested models 


















































































Civil war  -.0067  .0007 
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(.0042) (.0036) 


























Descriptions     
AIC -17651.87 -10023.3 -24404.48 -13426.74 
BIC -17585.35 -9931.703 -24331.32 -13335.2 
Deviance -17671.87 -10053.3 -24426.48 -13456.74 
N° observations 5724 3316 5724 3316 
N° countries 172 152 172 152 
N° years 39 27   
Note: *** = p<0.01. ** = p<0.05. * = p<0.1.  
Standard errors, or standard deviation for random effects, are in the parentheses.  
 
As seen in Table 5.1 are the results from the regressions for all four models specified. It is 
fairly evident, from the descriptions of each model, that Model 3 is preferable from a statistical 
point of view. Models 1 and 3 were the ones fitted based on an exploratory procedure (see for 
instance Hox 2010, 55-59) where alternately only the fixed and only the random effects were 
changed and tested. They are the results of several rounds of AIC, BIC and deviance indicating 
which models were better. Models 2 and 4 were the ones fitted from a purely theoretical point 
of view. There is more missing data within these two models, as a result of all explanatory 
variables being present, and thus they have a much smaller number of observations than the 
other two models. It could be of interest to run such analyses again after imputation and see if 
the smaller models were still preferred. 
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The effects of age were excluded from models 1 and 3 during the fittings, but they are included 
in 2 and 4. Age is significant at a 1 % level and negative in model 2 but positive and non-
significant in model 4. It is rather the effect of the quadratic age term that is significant in both 
models, and the direction of the effect is unchanged. A negative value for a quadratic term 
means a concave curve, again matching the figure which can be found in the Appendix. This 
effect seems to strengthen the findings of Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton (2016) of a maturation 
effect. It does not lend any strength to theories of decay. Like age, another predictor that 
changes across models is GDP per capita. It is significant at the 1 % level in model 2, but 
insignificant in model 4. The effect is positive in both models. Civil society also follows this 
pattern, but for opposite models. In model 1 and 2 the slight effect is insignificant, whereas in 
model 3 and 4 it is stronger and significant at the 1 % level.  
 
The predicators of civil war and population size are insignificant across all model specifications. 
The direction of their effect even changes across the different models. This is contrary to 
expectations, as civil war and population size are among the “usual suspects” of research on de 
facto rights respect. It is worth questioning whether this change is due to the ten subcomponents 
related to structural provisions, or if is something else affecting this outcome. Another 
unexpected outcome is the effect of year in Models 3 and 4. The effect is significant at a 95 % 
level, but the direction of the effect is negative. The trend that seemed visible in the bivariate 
visualisations of Chapter 4 do not apply in these models.  
 
The number of provisions squared, democracy, and compliance with the high court are all 
significant at the 1 % level for all model specifications. The curvilinear relationship between 
comprehensiveness and compliance, seen in Figure 5.2, is confirmed by the direction of the 
coefficient. The higher number of provisions a constitution has, the more the correlation is 
positive, even if it starts negative. This goes against the findings of Metelska-Szaniawska (2021, 
188-189) for post-socialist states, but supports those of Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton (2016). 
Compliance with the court mattered much more often than the independence of the court, and 
the two were negatively correlated at -0.312. This is not quite in line with the expectations from 
previous research, as independence of the courts typically is an important explainer of respect 
for rights provisions in practice. The courts’ enforcing role do matter to compliance, however, 
and it could be a question of operationalisation and measures.  
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That democracy should have a positive and significant effect on constitutional compliance is 
according to the research on de facto respect for rights provisions and confirms expectations. 
The measure of electoral democracy, rather than liberal democracy, was used to avoid 
capturing some accountability structures inherent in the more expansive concept. The effect 
seems no less significant and while there are reasons for complying with the highest law 
regardless of regime-type, the result of this analysis indicates there are mechanisms at work in 
democracies that consistently result in a higher degree of compliance.  
 
While democracy is a significant predictor of constitutional compliance overall, this ought to 
be accompanied by the caveat that this relationship might be influenced by this rather 
ubiquitous effect as concerns rights provisions. As we have seen exhibited in the previous 
chapter, the effect of democracy might be of a less strong or clear nature if testing only for 
procedural or structural parts of constitutions. It would be of interest to test all the determinants 
for the different components, separately, given the addition of more subcomponents to the 
index.  
 
The degree of autocorrelation of the error structures in the data, as well as the very high ICC 
for country as a varying intercept, indicate that path dependency is a dominant predictor of 
constitutional compliance. This seems reasonable to expect as an outcome of institutional 
practices; the average constitution might have what is considered a rather short lifespan, 19 
years according to the data of Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton (2009, 2), but they are still pretty 
invariant fixtures in our first level of analysis. The degree to which they are complied with is 
absolutely subject to change, but we don’t often expect human rights practices or structural 
relationships within different branches of government to change drastically each year. This 
might also explain some of the very low values for the regression coefficients; there is not that 
much yearly variance that can be affected by anything other than path dependence. 
 
5.3.1 Weaknesses of the model 
 
The testing of assumption showed there were problems with excessive levels of autocorrelation 
in models 1 and 2. Models 3 and 4 were fitted so as to account for an autoregressive error 
covariance. The only major change between models 1 and 3, which are then fitted for the same 
variables except the inclusion of varying intercepts for year in model 1 and year included as a 
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fixed effect in model 3, were the indicator for civil society engagement. This indicator became 
significant in the latter model. Other diagnosis of the models showed more kurtosis in the 
distribution of residuals in models 1 and 2 than in models 3 and 4, and less ideal visualisations 
for the linearity of models 3 and 4, than for the two former models. Where the two models 
diverge in their findings ought therefore to be associated with more uncertainty. Additional 
efforts in imputing might also have made a difference for the more maximalist models 2 and 4; 
at the very least it could give us a better indication of model fit. 
 
It is important to stress that any findings here are of a preliminary rather than concluding sort. 
The compliance index is not fully mapped out, especially as it pertains structural provisions, 
so any results can only reflect the measure as it stands at present. That said, many of the 
findings are consistent across the different models and the analysis provides at least support to 
the effect of these predictors. Further analysis into what affects adherence to structural 
provisions, as well as analysis of compliance as a broader concept than just rights provisions, 
would be beneficial for knowledge about which conditions foster constitutional respect across 
differing contexts. Such information could be instrumental in aiding constitution-making 
processes in the future.  
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6 Final thoughts 
 
6.1 Discussions about findings 
 
The compliance index gives empirical indications that constitutional compliance takes on 
different shapes and related differently to surroundings depending on which provisions are 
assessed for their real-world adherence. This especially concerns the component related to 
executive powers, which generally inspire much more compliance than the provisions for the 
judiciary or public administration measured here. While we know more about the respect for 
rights provisions and state repression, more research into these other parts of the constitution 
seem necessary. 
 
6.2 Discussions about methodology and potential weaknesses 
 
Any analysis resulting from the current version of this index needs to be interpreted knowing 
that this is not a complete measure of constitutional compliance. As addressed in Chapter 3, 
the conceptual validity of the measure suffers from lack of more indicators. It especially suffers 
from lack of more indicators assessing structural provisions. There is, after all, only a single 
variable measuring respect for provisions regarding the judiciary. Two provisions measuring 
the respect for provisions regarding the legislature are also a considerately less than ideal 
situation. Given that the index contains more rights provisions than structural one, 14 to 10, it 
is slightly weighted in that direction. The total of ten provisions measured across more 
structurally oriented provisions, however, provides a more complete measurement of 
constitutional compliance than one considering only rights provisions, and the measurement 
might therefore be considered as a step in the direction of measuring all compliance. 
 
My conceptualisation of constitutionalism might not be sufficient. There might be need for 
additional indicators, providing some sort of qualification as to what can be considered 
restraining and enabling. The measurement strategy applied in the creating of the index also 
allows the label of “compliant” to states Sartori (1962) would deem nominal. My stance has 
throughout this project been simplistic; as long as there are provisions regarding the subject 
present and they are followed, then there is adherence. And adherence is qualitatively different 
from “shamness”. This is already explicit in Sartori’s work, however, with the three categories 
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of sham, nominal and garantiste. The area between merely describing existing power structures 
and actually creating constraints and structures seem somewhat more elusive, at least in this 
index. Writing a constitution often is, after all, an exercise in describing where power should 
and should not reside. If there is considerable attention paid to selecting institutional 
frameworks that form real limitations on power, perhaps a measure such as this will be enough 
to capture constitutionalism.  
 
There is also another type of methodology applied in this thesis. In the exploration into some 
of the likely predictors for the compliance index there were quite strong indications that 
electoral democracy, compliance on behalf of the government with the high court in decisions 
it disagrees with, and the convex association with comprehensiveness all affect compliance 
scores. Further results seemed to indicate that several of the other variables modelled might 
have an effect, such as the concave association with constitutional age and total number of 
provisions present in the constitution. The models had some varying results, and due to some 
weaknesses with them I have chosen to regard them with increased uncertainty. Those results 
that occurred across all the models, however, should be somewhat more trustworthy. The 
strongest, and perhaps most unsurprising, finding is perhaps the indication of path dependency 
in country-year scores for the compliance index. Between-country variation was much greater 
than that of between-year variation, and the covariance structure had a very high degree of 
autocorrelation, both suggesting that compliance is related with past compliance.  
 
6.3 Discussions of potential and future applications of a compliance index 
 
As stated in the previous section, the measure as it stands now has its uses, though they are 
limited by the shortcomings associated with data availability. In my ideal world, there would 
be expansions and improvements upon the compliance index resulting in a measurement with 
considerable validity and reliability. Such a measure could be used for insight into how 
constitutions perform according to its own text in diverse contexts. This has real world 
applications for recommendations in processes of constitution-making. What institutional 
arrangements inspire most compliance given certain political, social, and historical conditions? 
Might certain structures be more unstable in certain conditions? Theories of constitutional 
functions do suggest, however, that compliance is related to the amount of effort and 
investment is sunk into the process, and therefore any top-down or outside-in process of 
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constitution-making might have negative and unintended consequences. Even if they come 
prepared with all the insights of what typically works elsewhere. Self-enforcement comes in 
many shapes and are crucial to constitutionalism.  
 
As Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton (2016, 238) argue, knowing where the gaps are does not give 
you knowledge of how the constitution works. Given that this entire enterprise was motivated 
out of struggling with definitions of constitutionalism, and that I’ve operationalised compliance 
as a mechanism through which constitutionalism works, I’m cannot with any credibility say I 
believe compliance does not tell us about constitutional functions. Where I do agree is with 
their argument for assessment of mobilisation around constitutions in hopes of discovering 
causal mechanisms on when, how, where, and why they do work. Different methods taking 
aim at clarifying different aspects of how constitutions work can only complement one another. 
Any quantitative measure on such gaps between de jure and de facto power structures could 
for instance be useful for locating instances of positive change. And increased knowledge of 
how constitutions function might further improve measurements of such functions. 
 
6.4 Final thoughts 
 
The aim of this thesis is to engage in a discussion of how to define and measure 
constitutionalism. It is a concept I struggled with understanding when I first encountered it, as 
it felt like it kept changing depending on what text I was reading. That frustration turned into 
fascination, and eventually I had a myriad of new questions that wanted answering. This 
resulted in an interest in measuring constitutional compliance as a mechanism of 
constitutionalism, in an attempt at getting closer to measurements of constitutionalism. Such 
measurements I believe, for both concepts, cannot be without controversy but should not be 
shied away from on those grounds. The resultant index is lacking, mostly I hope, due to data 
availability but surely also in some eyes, due to differing opinions on concept and measurement 
methodology as well as understandings of the underlying concept of constitutionalism. Yet it 
might give some preliminary insights into what constitutional compliance in a broader sense 
than respect for rights provisions look like and how it might behave differently.  
 
I have expressed that there might be a need for further expanding on the conceptualisation of 
constitutionalism, outside of compliance, but would also like to offer up for discussion the 
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notion that compliance could be sufficient. If the inclusion of more provisions firmly kept focus 
on what provisions might restrain or enable government power, countries whose constitutions 
could be classified as nominal in Sartori’s framework (1962) would not contain “enough” 
provisions for achieving the highest scores among compliant countries. The countries with 
more constitutionalism then comply with more structuring of government power, while those 
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Figure 1 Visualisations for regression assumptions for model 1 
 




Figure 3 Visualisations for regression assumptions for model 4 
 
 
 
 
